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INTRODUCTION: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DISRUPTS THE BALANCE 
In the aftermath of September 11, the Attorney General 
responded to attendant national security concerns by barring the 
press from all alien removal proceedings1 that Department of 
Justice (DOJ) prosecutors categorize as “special interest.”2  
Prosecutors can affix special interest labels in any instance when 
they allege that a case poses national security concerns, but they 
are not required to justify such categorization to the immigration 
judges that preside over these matters.3  Moreover, judges cannot 
easily challenge the prosecutors’ decisions,4 and the directive bars 
 
1 The Department of Justice [DOJ] and, until this year, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service [INS] and the Executive Office for Immigration Review [EOIR], 
played significant roles in the oversight of those individuals without citizenship in the 
United States. 
 Traditionally, the INS initiated a removal proceeding by alleging that a non-citizen 
(“alien”) had committed acts that voided his privilege to remain in the United States.  The 
INS could prosecute charges of removability against certain individuals who gained 
admission into the United States as legal aliens, and against others who either arrived 
without acquiring legal status or whose authorized period of stay expired.  Immigration 
and Nationality Act [INA] § 240(e)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2003). 
 The INS presented its allegations before the EOIR, a second division within the DOJ 
that oversaw litigation between the INS and the allegedly removable individuals. See 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.0 (2003) (establishing the EOIR). 
 The EOIR utilized its immigration courts, administered by immigration judges, to 
adjudicate such cases. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10 (outlining the responsibilities of 
immigration judges).  The EOIR’s Board of Immigration Appeals [BIA] processed 
appeals brought by the INS or by respondents. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (detailing the BIA’s 
structure). 
 Since the formation of the Department of Homeland Security [DHS], however, the 
INS has been replaced by the DHS’s Bureau of Immigration and Citizenship Services and 
two other DHS bureaus. 
2 The Attorney General issued the policy through Chief Immigration Judge Michael 
Creppy, the judge within EOIR who oversees the immigration courts. See Memorandum 
from Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, EOIR, to all Immigration Judges and 
Court Administrators (Sept. 21, 2002) (introducing this policy), http://news.findlaw.com/ 
hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy092101memo.pdf [hereinafter Creppy Directive]. 
3 See Creppy Directive, supra note 2 (outlining the new policy). 
4 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.27, 1003.31, 1003.46.  Under the Creppy Directive, the DOJ is 
not required to demonstrate to immigration judges why a case should fall within the 
special interest category.  In May 2002, the Attorney General amended the CFR to allow 
the DOJ’s power to submit evidence liberally, which immigration judges must treat as 
pertinent to national security.  The regulations then require immigration judges to seal 
this evidence, and close any hearing that concerns sealed evidence. Id. 
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judges from publicizing these cases.5  Recent additions to the 
removal procedure also prohibit all parties from discussing such 
cases outside of court.6 
Rather than implementing the new guidelines, the Attorney 
General could have maintained the previous policy that allowed 
immigration judges to decide whether to close their own 
courtrooms.  Before the September 11 changes, these judges—
whose courts are enveloped in the DOJ’s Executive Office for 
Immigration Review (EOIR)—closed their courtrooms only after 
determining whether a case’s particular circumstances warranted 
such action.7  If the Attorney General had not installed the special 
interest procedures, immigration judges could have considered new 
security concerns while balancing press freedoms.  The Attorney 
General’s policy diminishes the discretion of immigration judges, 
and it favors the prerogatives of the DOJ prosecutors by granting 
the prosecutors decision-making powers without the check of 
media supervision. 
Two groups of media plaintiffs have sought to enjoin 
enforcement of the special interest procedures, but their actions 
have yielded mixed results.  In cases appealed to the Third and 
Sixth Circuits, the plaintiffs contended that, by barring media from 
the selected hearings, the DOJ interfered with the press’s right to 
observe them on the public’s behalf.8  The plaintiffs grounded their 
argument both in First Amendment principle and in the express 
 
5 See Creppy Directive, supra note 2 (stating that immigration courts should not place 
information about special interest hearings on their public dockets, nor should they enter 
data into a telephone system that provides information to the public on immigration 
proceedings). 
6 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46(f)(2)(i). 
7 Compare 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 (1997), with 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27 (2003). 
8 See Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 4–5, N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F. 
Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J.) (describing the causes of action), rev’d, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 
2002), http://archive.aclu.org/court/creppy.pdf (last visited May 10, 2003) [hereinafter 
North Jersey Complaint]; Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Injunctive and Declarative Relief at 
10–12, Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (noting, 
likewise, the cause of action) (on file with the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & 
Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter Detroit Free Press Complaint]. 
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language of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).9  In reply, the 
DOJ asserted that the nation’s changed circumstances after 
September 11 compelled its actions.10  Although the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan and sided with the media plaintiffs,11 the Third Circuit 
overturned the U.S. District Court of New Jersey and supported the 
DOJ.12  It seems likely that the Supreme Court will grant a writ of 
certiorari to resolve the circuit split. 
It is important to note that on March 1, 2003, the United States 
shifted the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) into the 
new Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security (DHS).13  
Three bureaus within the DHS assumed the INS’s responsibilities.  
The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (BCIS) took 
on the INS’s immigration benefit services,14 the Bureau of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) assumed the INS’s 
law enforcement functions,15 and the Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection (BCBP) shouldered aspects of border patrol 
formerly under the INS’s purview.16 
Despite the INS’s dissolution, the EOIR will continue to 
operate as a DOJ agency and will retain its responsibility to 
 
9 North Jersey Complaint, supra note 8, at 4–5; Detroit Free Press Complaint, supra 
note 8, at 10–12. 
10 See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 940 (E.D. Mich.) (noting 
that “the subtext” of the government’s argument is its “right to suspend certain personal 
liberties in the pursuit of national security”), aff’d, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). 
11 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002). 
12 N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 221 (3d Cir. 2002). 
13 See Philip Shenon, Page Threats and Responses: Domestic Security—Ridge 
Discovers Size of Home Security Task, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2003, at A1 (noting that the 
government incorporated twenty-two agencies into the DHS). 
14 Such services include “the adjudication of family and employment-based petitions; 
issuance of employment authorization documents, asylum and refugee processing; 
naturalization; and implementation of special status programs such as Temporary 
Protected Status.” Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Immigration Service 
Transition Will Be Smooth, Agency Says: Offers Reassurances to Immigrants about 
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adjudicate immigration cases.17  After these changes, the BCIS will 
initiate these cases, just as the INS had done before.18  The 
ramifications of the dissolution remain unclear since the full 
transition of responsibilities from the DOJ to the DHS will 
probably take over a year.19  Evidence suggests that DOJ initiatives 
such as the special interest policy will remain binding until further 
notice.20  In fact, the Attorney General signed an order on February 
28, 2003, explicitly stating that the DHS will administer certain 
regulations formerly under the DOJ’s purview, but that the scope 
of these responsibilities will not change.21  For the sake of clarity, 
this Note will use the term “INS,” wherever appropriate, when 
referring to the agency formerly known by that acronym. 
This Note will track the conflict between media interests and 
the government, from its origins to its present state.  It also will 
advocate for restoration of the access policy in place before 
September 11.  Section I will reveal that before the September 11 
attacks, the public enjoyed a presumptive right of public access to 
DOJ alien removal proceedings.  Section II describes the genesis 
and implementation of the special interest procedure, and will 
assess the ramifications of an order that redefined the special 
interest policy and incorporated it formally into the CFR.22  The 
section also chronicles the litigation challenging the procedure, 
from district courts to the benches of the Third and Sixth Circuits.  
Section III argues for the dissolution of “special interest” 
procedures and the restoration of the discretionary power once held 
by immigration judges to make case-by-case determinations 
regarding press access to their courtrooms.  Finally, Section IV 
offers the commentary of scholars who have considered the 
 
17 See Florangela Davila, INS Sheds Its Name at Midnight; Agency to Be Under 
Homeland Umbrella, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 28, 2003, at B1. See also 28 C.F.R. § 200.1 
(2003) (stating that the DOJ will retain authority over the EOIR). 
18 See Davila, supra note 17. 
19 Marisa Taylor & Joe Cantlupe, Homeland Security Nervously Springs to Life, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 1, 2003, at A1. 
20 See supra note 14. 
21 Aliens and Nationality; Homeland Security, 68 Fed. Reg. 9824 (Feb. 28, 2003).  This 
order shifted regulations formerly found in section 3 of 8 C.F.R. to section 1000. Id.  For 
example, 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 is now 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27. 
22 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27 (2003). 
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possible outcome of this debate.  Most scholars agree that because 
the Supreme Court has not considered a press access case since the 
1980s,23 it will be difficult to accurately predict the Court’s 
disposition. 
I. BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11, THE PRESS ENJOYED A QUALIFIED 
RIGHT OF ACCESS TO REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 
The DOJ, a division of the executive branch, traditionally has 
overseen immigration matters for the United States that include the 
removal of aliens.24  The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
authorizes the DOJ, through its Attorney General, to conduct 
removal proceedings and to oversee immigration law.25  Through 
the INA, Congress has employed its plenary power over 
immigration matters and has authorized the DOJ to restrict the 
movements of aliens in the United States and to remove them from 
America’s shores.26  Congress passed the first version of the INA 
in 1952, which consolidated the disparate strands of immigration 
and naturalization law then in existence.27  Congress has since 
revised the INA, but the 1952 version remains the backbone of 
U.S. immigration law.28 
Nevertheless, the INA changed rather dramatically29 in 1996, 
when President Bill Clinton signed both the Illegal Immigration 
 
23 See Press-Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 13 (1986) (recognizing the press’ 
qualified right of access to preliminary hearings, grounded in the First Amendment) 
[hereinafter Press-Enterprise II]. 
24 See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2000) (discussing the power of the Attorney General to 
enforce the INA and “all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of 
aliens”). 
25 Id. 
26 See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586–87 (1952) (stating that only as “a 
matter of permission and tolerance” can aliens remain in the United States, and that “the 
government’s power to terminate its hospitality has been asserted and sustained by this 
Court”). 
27 MARIAN L. SMITH, Overview of INS History, in A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE U.S. 
GOVERNMENT (George T. Kurian ed., 1998), available at http://www.immigration.gov/ 
graphics/aboutus/history/articles/OVIEW.htm (last modified Feb. 28, 2003). 
28 Id. 
29 See Michael D. Patrick, The Consequence of Criminal Behavior, 220 N.Y.L.J. 18 
(1998) (discussing the impact of IIRIRA and AEDPA on aliens). 
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Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)30 and 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(AEDPA) into law.31  IIRIRA merged formerly distinct deportation 
hearings and exclusion proceedings into the removal proceedings 
now in operation.32  Deportation hearings dealt with the cases of 
those aliens who had gained entry into the United States, whether 
legally or illegally, whereas exclusion hearings concerned those 
who had not entered the country.33  Today, the INA outlines a 
number of grounds under which individuals without citizenship 
can be removed from the United States, including: (1) 
inadmissibility into the United States;34 (2) violation of the law;35 
(3) lack of adherence to a visa’s terms;36 or (4) actions that threaten 
national security.37 
The EOIR, under the purview of the DOJ, administers removal 
proceedings.38  Until the DOJ created the EOIR in 1983, 
immigration judges held removal proceedings in immigration 
courts within the INS.39  Some questioned whether immigration 
judges could be objective within such a structure because the INS 
was also a DOJ agency that investigated and prosecuted INA 
violations by aliens.40  The creation of the EOIR resolved the 
perceived conflict of interest by bringing the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (BIA)41 and the immigration courts within a new quasi-
 
30 Pub L. No. 104-208 div. C, 110 Stat. 3009, 3555 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 
(2000)). 
31 Pub L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1217, 1220 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244 
(2000)). 
32 Pub L. No. 104-208, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009, 3596 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229–30) . 
33 Id. 
34 8 U.S.C. § 1182. 
35 Id. § 1227. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0 (2003) (establishing the EOIR). 
39 Id. 
40 See LeTourneur v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 538 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th 
Cir. 1976) (holding that, despite LeTourneur’s challenge, the former immigration court 
structure did not violate due process). 
41 The Board of Immigration Appeals serves as the chief appellate body within the 
immigration system. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review: 
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judicial division of the DOJ that operates autonomously from the 
former INS.42  The EOIR structure remains in place today, and its 
immigration courts provide the forum for the BCIS to litigate cases 
it brings against individuals without citizenship.  The immigration 
courts are scattered across the country, and the Office of the Chief 
Immigration Judge, also within the EOIR, administers them.43 
All removal proceedings take place under a specific protocol.  
To initiate removal, a DOJ representative must file a Notice to 
Appear (hereinafter “Notice”)44 to compel an alien’s appearance in 
immigration court.45  The Notice must describe a removal 
proceeding, and it must list allegations, supported by fact, so that 
the accused individual is aware of the statutory provisions he may 
have breached.46  After receipt of the Notice, the individual must 
stand before an immigration judge at a preliminary court 
appearance and affirm or deny the allegations raised by the 
government.47  If the person admits to the charges in the Notice, 
thereby conceding an INA violation that allows for removal, the 
immigration judge accepts this plea and the government will 
remove the individual from the United States.48 
If the individual intends to challenge the court’s finding of 
removability or request a form of relief from removal, the 
 
Board of Immigration Appeals, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/biainfo.htm (last 
visited May 10, 2003). 
42 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0. 
43 The Office of the Chief Immigration Judge oversees the immigration court structure: 
The Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ) provides overall program 
direction, articulates policies and procedures, and establishes priorities for more 
than 220 Immigration Judges located in 52 Immigration Courts throughout the 
Nation.  The Chief Immigration Judge carries out these responsibilities with the 
assistance and support of two Deputy Chief Immigration Judges and nine 
Assistant Chief Immigration Judges. 
U. S. Dep’t of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review: Office of the Chief 
Immigration Judge, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/ocijinfo.htm (last visited May 
10, 2003). 
44 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) (2003). 
45 Id. § (c)(1)(A) (stating that the INA instructs immigration judges to “decide whether 
an alien is removable from the United States”). 
46 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1). 
47 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c). 
48 Id. 
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immigration judge must allow him to present his case formally in 
an individual hearing.49  This hearing is analogous to a trial held 
within the judicial branch.  Both parties have a right to 
representation, and the government’s counsel is a BCIS-employed 
attorney.50  The respondent can choose his own counsel.  The 
government, however, will not provide an attorney for an indigent 
party.51  Both the respondent and the government can present 
evidence and the immigration judge and respondent may cross-
examine witnesses.52  Under the INA, the former INS53 carries the 
burden of proof and must demonstrate “reasonable, substantial, and 
probative” evidence that the respondent is removable.54  After each 
side presents its case, the immigration judge renders a final 
decision.55  Nevertheless, both parties may move for reopening or 
reconsideration, or may appeal the immigration judge’s decision to 
the BIA.56  After exhausting opportunities for administrative 
review, the parties can pursue certain appeals in the Federal Court 
of Appeals for the judicial circuit covering the same geographic 
region in which the immigration proceedings took place.57 
Before the September 11 attacks, the press and the public 
enjoyed a qualified right to observe immigration court removal 
 
49 § 240(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1). 
50 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2(b). 
51 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A). See also 8 C.F.R. § 240.10(a)(2) (stating that aliens must 
be notified of pro-bono legal resources if they cannot afford representation). 
52 Id. § (b)(1), (b)(4)(B). See also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2(a) (stating that “the duties of the 
Service counsel include, but are not limited to, the presentation of evidence and the 
interrogation, examination, and cross-examination of the respondent or other witnesses”). 
53 Editor’s note: At the time of publication, the INA’s language has not yet been 
modified to reflect INS’s incorporation into the DHS. 
54 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(3)(c)(A). 
55 Id. § 1229a(c)(1)(A). 
56 See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2(a) (discussing the procedure for reopening a removal 
proceeding). See also id. § 1003.23(b)(1) (noting that an alien or government counsel can 
call for reconsideration of an immigration judge’s decision); id. § 1003.1(b)(3) (stating 
that the DOJ supervises the BIA, which has jurisdiction over appeals of immigration 
court judgments). 
 The BIA does not ordinarily hold hearings, but bases its decisions on the record of 
the immigration court and upon briefs submitted by counsel. Id. §§ 1003.1(e), 1003.3(c), 
1003.5.  The BIA hears oral arguments only if the petitioner requests such an 
opportunity. Id. § 1003.1(e)(7). 
57 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2003). 
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proceedings.58  Although the CFR barred the public from exclusion 
hearings, it permitted public attendance at all deportation 
hearings.59  It listed several exceptions, however, to this rule.60  It 
allowed an immigration judge to limit access in cases of 
overcrowding (granting priority to the press) or to protect 
“witnesses, parties, or the public interest.”61  The regulations also 
compelled an immigration judge to close her courtroom when 
handling a case of spousal abuse, unless the allegedly abused 
spouse consented to public access, and to close all cases pertaining 
to alleged child abuse.62 
II. IN RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 11, THE DOJ BARRED PRESS 
ACCESS TO SPECIAL INTEREST REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS, BUT PRESS 
INTERESTS HAVE VEHEMENTLY CHALLENGED THIS POLICY 
CHANGE 
A. The DOJ Initiated the Special Interest Procedure in Reaction 
to the Events of September 11 
In response to the tragic loss of life on September 11, various 
branches of the government have pursued a War on Terror.63  
Among the measures taken, Congress passed the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT 
 
58 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 (1997) (current version at 8 C.F.R § 1003.27 (2003)).  The C.F.R. 
still distinguishes between exclusion and deportation even though the INA no longer does 




62 Id.  The presumed right of public access did not extend to the BIA before September 
11, and does not do so today.  The BIA fields its appeals without oral argument unless the 
petitioner requests otherwise and the BIA grants this request. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(7). 
63 See John Yaukey, Ridge Faces Tough Challenges as Nation’s First Homeland 
Security Chief, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Nov. 26, 2002, at 8 (quoting President George W. Bush, 
“We’re fighting a war against terror with all our resources, and we’re determined to 
win.”). 
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Act), an omnibus anti-terrorism bill, on October 26, 2001.64  “The 
Act makes many changes to criminal, immigration, banking, and 
intelligence law” in an effort to streamline investigations related to 
terrorism.65  A number of organizations, including the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), have strongly criticized the 
measure as an affront to basic freedoms.66  Nevertheless, working 
drafts of legislation known as the PATRIOT Act II have begun to 
circulate, and, if approved, would further expand law enforcement 
powers.67  Other governmental actions have included the military’s 
 
64 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) 
[hereinafter PATRIOT Act]. 
65 David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 966 (2002). 
66 See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union, USA Patriot Act Boosts Government Powers 
While Cutting Back on Traditional Checks and Balances: An ACLU Legislative Analysis 
(Nov. 1, 2001) (alleging that the Act erodes the rights of aliens, grants unchecked 
surveillance powers to Federal investigators, allows for secret searches, grants the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation [FBI] broad powers to seize business records, and 
permits investigations of citizens merely for undefined “intelligence” purposes) (on file 
with the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal). 
67 On February 7, 2003, the Center for Public Integrity acquired an unpublished draft 
copy of the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 [hereinafter PATRIOT Act II] 
and posted it on its Web site. See Charles Lewis & Adam Mayle, Justice Dept. Drafts 
Sweeping Expansion of Anti-Terrorism Act: Center Publishes Secret Draft of ‘Patriot II’ 
Legislation, Center for Public Integrity (Feb. 7, 2003), available at 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/report.asp?ReportID=502&L1=10&L2=10&L3=0
&L4=0&L5=0. 
 According to Professor Jack M. Balkin of the Yale Law School, PATRIOT Act II: 
would remove existing protections under the Freedom of Information Act, 
making it easier for the government to hide whom it is holding and why, and 
preventing the public from ever obtaining embarrassing information about 
government overreaching. 
 Another section would nullify existing consent decrees against state law 
enforcement agencies that prevent the agencies from spying on individuals and 
organizations. . . . 
 Perhaps the most troubling section would strip U.S. citizenship from anyone 
who gives “material support” to any group that the [A]ttorney [G]eneral 
designates as a terrorist organization. . . .  Under our Constitution, Americans 
can’t be deprived of their citizenship, and the rights that go with it, unless they 
voluntarily give it up. 
 The measure would get around that constitutional guarantee through a legal 
loophole.  It presumes that anyone who provides “material support” to an 
organization on the [A]ttorney [G]eneral’s blacklist—even if that support is 
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detention of alleged “enemy combatants” at the United States 
Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,68 battles with 
Afghanistan’s Taliban regime,69 war with Iraq,70 and the creation 
of the Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security.71 
As an executive branch agency, the DOJ also joined in efforts 
to prosecute the War on Terror, and, to this end, established new 
procedures for special interest removal proceedings.  At the request 
of Attorney General John Ashcroft, Chief Immigration Judge 
Michael Creppy released a notice (hereinafter the “Creppy 
Directive”) to all immigration judges on September 21, 2001.72  
The Creppy Directive informed immigration judges that the DOJ 
 
otherwise lawful—has intended to relinquish citizenship and therefore may be 
immediately expatriated. 
Jack M. Balkin, Editorial, Commentary: A Dreadful Act II: Secret Proposals in 
Ashcroft’s Anti-Terror War Strike Yet Another Blow at Fundamental Rights, L.A. TIMES, 
Feb. 13, 2003, at B23. 
68 See Mary Jacoby, Safety and Rights in the Balance, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), 
Sept. 16, 2002, at 1A. 
69 See Warren P. Strobel, U.S., Iran Exchange Ideas over Iraq, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 1, 
2002, at 3. 
70 Id. 
71 Richard W. Stevenson, Threats and Responses: The President; Signing Homeland 
Security Bill, Bush Appoints Ridge as Secretary, N.Y. TIMES, Nov, 26, 2002, at A1. 
72 The document states, in pertinent part: 
Immigration Courts are beginning to receive cases for which the [DOJ] is 
requiring special arrangements. 
The following procedures are being followed for these cases: . . . 
3.  Each of these cases is to be heard separately from all other cases on the 
docket.  The courtroom must be closed for these cases—no visitors, no 
family, and no press. 
4.  The Record of Proceeding is not to be released to anyone except an attorney 
or representative who has . . . [EOIR clearance] on file for the case 
(assuming the file does not contain classified information). . . . 
5.  This restriction on information includes confirming or denying whether 
such a case is on the docket or scheduled for a hearing.  . . . 
6.  [I]nformation about the case [shall not be] provided on the 1-800 number 
and the case [shall not be] listed on the court calendars posted outside the 
courtrooms 
. . . . 
8. Finally, you should instruct all courtroom personnel, including both court 
employees and contract interpreters, that they are not to discuss the case 
with anyone. 
Creppy Directive, supra note 2. 
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would label certain removal proceedings as special interest, by 
alleging that the individuals facing removal possessed ties to 
terrorist activities.73  The Creppy Directive also advised 
immigration judges that the DOJ prohibited the press and public’s 
attendance at such special interest proceedings, and it prevented 
immigration judges from publicizing the proceedings.74  By 
closing special interest hearings without first allowing immigration 
judges to weigh evidence and make determinations on a case-by-
case basis, media interests have argued that the Creppy Directive 
directly infringes on their rights to attend such proceedings as the 
eyes and ears of the public. 
B. The Attorney General Reinforced the Creppy Directive with an 
Order 
Despite criticism brought by media interests against the Creppy 
Directive, Attorney General Ashcroft codified and expanded its 
principles by crafting an order that amended 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 and 8 
C.F.R. §§ 3.31(d) and added 3.46.75  Because of the Attorney 
General’s order that relocates portions of the CFR to accommodate 
the DHS,76 these regulations now are found in section 1000, as 8 
C.F.R. §§ 1003.27, 1003.31, and 1003.46.  The immediately 
enforceable changes both codified the Creppy Directive’s 
provisions and expanded upon them.77 
The addition to section 1003.31 permits the government to 




75 Protection Orders in Immigration Administrative Proceedings, 67 Fed. Reg. 36799, 
36799 (May 28, 2002) (amending 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.27, 3.31 and adding 3.46 (2002)). 
76 8 C.F.R. § 200.1. 
77 See Protection Orders in Immigration Administrative Proceedings, 67 Fed. Reg. 
36799, 36799 (May 28, 2002) (amending 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.27, 3.31 and adding 3.46 (2002)).  
On July 16, 2002, Chief Immigration Judge Creppy released a second memorandum for 
those affiliated with immigration courts.  It provided instructions regarding enforcement 
of the new regulatory language, and it clarified the manner in which the new language 
bolstered his memorandum of September 21, 2001. See Memorandum from Michael J. 
Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, EOIR, to All Immigration Judge[s], All Court 
Administrators, All Judicial Law Clerks, and All Immigration Court Staff (July 16, 
2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoia/ocij/oppm02/OPPM02-02.pdf. 
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seal.78  Section 1003.46 gives that judge little leeway to bar 
admittance of such documents.  Its language compels the judge to 
defer to the government’s contentions that the information it seals 
is both relevant and potentially injurious to national security.79  
Section 1003.46 also allows the government to preclude the 
respondent and her counsel from viewing such documents.80  As a 
result, immigration judges may receive one-sided arguments, 
which could lead them to bar the press from hearings that should 
have remained open. 
Once an immigration judge admits sealed information, section 
1003.46 compels her to release a protective order, which can 
prohibit respondents and their attorneys from sharing protected 
information without the permission of the government or the 
immigration judge.  If a respondent or her counselor breaches a 
protective order, the immigration judge must deny all forms of 
discretionary relief to the respondent, except bond, and may bar the 
counselor from appearing before the EOIR or before other 
government agencies handling immigration claims.81 
Protective orders implicate press interests because the revised 
section 1003.27 bars the press and public from any hearings with 
protected evidence.82  Moreover, because section 1003.46 renders 
protective orders permanently enforceable unless immigration 
judges vacate them, members of the media may be barred from 
ever reporting on cases that involved sealed documents.83  
Previously, if the press had been prohibited from a courtroom 
handling a special interest matter, reporters could contact 
respondents or their attorneys to learn about the events within the 
 
78 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(d). 
79 Id. § 1003.46. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. § 1003.46(i). 
82 Id. § 1003.27(d). 
83 Id. § 1003.46(f). See also Jim Edwards, As Judge Enjoins Blanket Secrecy, U.S. 
Adopts Rules for Closed Deport Hearings—Provides for Protective Orders and Sanctions 
for Lawyers Who Flout Them, 168 N.J.L.J. 828 (2002) (“There is no time limit or 
expiration date once a protective order sealing a case is handed down. . . .  [A] journalist 
wanting to research the story of Sept. 11 decades from now would have to go back to 
court to get the order lifted.”). 
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courtroom.84  Such contact provided the press with some insight 
into the nature of these proceedings and the press could share this 
information with the public.85  As a result of the changes to the 
CFR, reporters can no longer consult any participant in a special 
interest case without subjecting such persons to stiff penalties.86 
Attorney General Ashcroft offered a number of reasons for 
codifying the expanded special interest procedure despite its 
restrictions on the press.  Among them, he stressed that while 
particular disclosures in the hearings might seem innocuous on 
their own, individuals seeking to harm the United States can 
cluster such fragments of intelligence into a mosaic of dangerous 
information.87  Ashcroft then argued that the changes passed 
constitutional muster because he believes they are no greater “than 
is necessary or essential to protect” the “important and substantial 
governmental interest in safeguarding the public, and national 
security and law enforcement concerns.”88  Thus, the Attorney 
General asserted that the restrictions were designed to protect 
national security interests and that they did not unnecessarily 
interfere with First Amendment principles.89 
 
84 See Edwards, supra note 83. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Protective Orders in Immigration Administrative Proceedings, 67 Fed. Reg. 36799, 
36799–36800 (May 28, 2002) (amending 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.27, 3.31 and adding 3.46). 
88 Id. at 36800. 
89 The Attorney General chose language evocative of the content neutrality test 
developed by the Supreme Court in United States v. O’Brien 391 U.S. 367 (1968), for 
determining when a regulation intended to control conduct can interfere permissibly with 
protected speech: 
A government regulation is sufficiently justified it is within the constitutional 
power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial 
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest. 
Id. at 377. 
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C. Since the DOJ Implemented the Creppy Directive, It Has 
Sought to Remove Hundreds of Aliens by Using Special 
Interest Procedures 
Since the Creppy Directive established special interest 
procedures on September 21, 2001, the DOJ has relied on them 
with regularity.  Recently, the DOJ revealed that more than 600 
removal proceedings have been conducted under special interest 
guidelines.90  The DOJ also confirmed that it had detained many 
more aliens than previously publicized.91  Despite the DOJ’s 
attempts to curtail public knowledge of special interest proceedings 
and related arrests, numerous stories have surfaced in recent 
months of aliens who have been detained by the DOJ for months at 
a time, without formal charges,92 and who have then faced special 
interest proceedings once the DOJ charged them with removable 
offenses.  Some aliens have discussed their experiences openly,93 
 
90 On July 3, 2002, Assistant Attorney General Daniel Bryant crafted a letter in 
response to an inquiry by Senator Carl Levin, Democrat-Michigan, chair of the Senate’s 
permanent subcommittee on investigations, regarding specifics of the special interest 
practice.  Bryant noted that, as of May 29, 2002, 611 of 752 people detained by the INS 
as part of the DOJ’s investigations on terrorism had been the subjects of special interest 
hearings.  Bryant added that the INS had retained custody of eighty-one individuals. See 
Tamara Audi, U.S. Held 600 for Secret Rulings, DETROIT FREE PRESS, July 18, 2002. 
 To contextualize the prevalence of the special interest proceedings, immigration 
judges handled more than 127,000 matters during the 1984 fiscal year, and more than 
284,000 matters during the 2001 fiscal year. Executive Office for Immigration Review 
Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Feb. 6, 2002) (statement of Kevin D. Rooney, 
Director, Executive Office for Immigration Review). 
91 See Matthew Brzezinski, Hady Hassan Omar’s Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 
2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 50 (noting that the DOJ regularly concealed the identities and 
locations of those individuals it detained during round-ups following the September 11 
attacks). 
92 See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (“On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may 
be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from 
the United States.”); Brzezinski, supra note 91, at 50 (citing Bill Strassberger, a 
spokesperson for the former INS, stating that the government may enforce such 
detentions for “reasonable” periods in cases it labels “emergencies”). See also Custody 
Procedures, 66 Fed. Reg. 48334 (Sept. 20, 2001) (amending 8 C.F.R. § 287.3(d) and 
codifying the language that Strassberger describes).  In practice, however, the policy “has 
been to lock up first, ask questions later.” Cole, supra note 65, at 964. 
93 See, e.g., Brzezinski, supra note 91, at 50 (detailing Hady Hassan Omar’s 
experiences while being investigated for alleged ties to terrorists). 
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while the stories of others surfaced when members of the press and 
public discovered specific removal proceedings.94 
The story of Hady Hassan Omar may be typical of the 
experiences faced by aliens who were detained without formal 
charges, but then faced closed special interest proceedings.  Omar, 
an Egyptian national with an American wife and daughter, lives in 
Fort Smith, Arkansas.95  On September 12, 2001, Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) agents came to his home and took him in for 
questioning.96  Although they did not disclose it initially, they 
wanted to know why Omar had used a Kinko’s computer in 
Florida to purchase an airline ticket.97  Mohammed Atta, the 
alleged leader of the September 11 hijackers, used the same 
computer within hours of Omar to purchase a ticket of his own.98  
Although the FBI did not charge Omar with a crime, its agents 
transferred custody of Omar to the INS, which then held Omar 
temporarily at one of its detention centers.99  Shortly thereafter, the 
INS moved him to a New Orleans prison.100  Omar says he 
remained in solitary confinement for months, often shackled, and 
that he faced numerous interrogations pertaining to his alleged 
involvement in terrorist activities.101  The government never 
charged Omar with a crime during this period of detention.  
Nevertheless, the government levied immigration charges; Omar 
received a Notice, in which the DOJ accused him of arranging his 
first marriage merely to secure residency in the United States.102 
 
94 See Detroit Free Press Complaint, supra note 8, at 4–6 (describing the substantial 
publicity surrounding the arrest of Rabih Haddad and the failed attempts of the press and 
public to attend his removal hearings); North Jersey Complaint, supra note 8, at 2–4 
(mentioning that immigration judges had barred numerous reporters from immigration 
courts to enforce the special interest policy). 
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These accusations led to a closed special interest hearing 
before an immigration judge.103  The immigration judge freed 
Omar on a $5,000 bond, but government counsel appealed,104 
forcing Omar back into custody.105  After more than two months of 
imprisonment, and Omar’s threats of suicide, the INS finally 
released Omar on November 20, 2001, but the INS is pursuing 
Omar’s removal based on the alleged impropriety of his first 
marriage.106 
A second well-publicized special interest case involves Rabih 
Haddad, a Lebanese national who is a community and religious 
leader in Ann Arbor, Michigan.107  Haddad also co-founded the 
Global Relief Foundation (hereinafter the “Foundation”), an 
Islamic charity.108  He has lived in Ann Arbor for various periods 
since 1988 and resides with his Kuwaiti wife and their four 
children.109  On December 14, 2001, INS officers arrested Haddad 
at his home for overstaying the six-month tourist visa that had 
allowed him legal entry into the United States, but which had 




105 Under a new regulation promulgated by an Executive Order, the INS “can keep the 
alien locked up simply by filing an appeal of the release order.” Cole, supra note 65, at 
965 (citing Review of Custody Determinations, Interim Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,909 (Oct. 
31, 2001) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3)). 
106 Other Muslim aliens have endured similar treatment, such as Shakir Baloch, a 
Canadian citizen of Pakistani origin.  He was detained for more than six months before 
his return to Canada.  Anser Mehmood was arrested in September 2001, but not formally 
charged until March 2002.  He was detained in an isolation cell with 24-hour lighting. 
See Brzezinski, supra note 91, at 50. 
107 See Detroit Free Press Complaint, supra note 8, at 4. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. See Nat’l Pub. Radio, NPR Special Report: Muslims in America-Part Three: 
Middle East Heritage in America’s Heartland (Nov. 5, 2001), available at 
http://www.npr.org/news/specials/response/home_front/features/2001/nov/muslim/01110
5.muslim.html.  Haddad’s family contributes to the population of more than 250,000 
people of Arab descent who live in southeastern Michigan, comprising the world’s third 
largest Arab community.  Many of these individuals are American citizens, but a number, 
like Haddad, are resident aliens. Id. 
110 See David Ashenfelter & Niraj Warikoo, Free Press Files Suit in Haddad Case: 
Newspaper Sues to Open Hearing, BRADENTON HERALD (Fla.), Oct. 3, 2002, at 9. See 
also Detroit Free Press Complaint, supra note 8, at 4 (noting that in April 2001, Haddad 
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the PATRIOT Act, the Treasury Department froze the 
Foundation’s assets.111  The DOJ alleges that the Foundation 
covertly funded activities of the Al Qaeda terrorist network, yet 
Haddad has not been formally charged with a crime.112  The DOJ 
initiated closed special interest removal proceedings against 
Haddad for violating his immigration status and has detained him 
since his arrest.113  An immigration judge recently denied Haddad 
the asylum he sought in order to reacquire legal status in the 
United States.114  He remains imprisoned, pending the outcome of 
his appeal to the BIA regarding his asylum application.115 
Although the stories of Hady Hassan Omar and Rabih Haddad 
exemplify the dramatic impact of special interest procedures on 
certain individuals, the special interest policy has also affected 
press interests.  Members of the press have been forced to rely 
primarily on incomplete information to chronicle the experiences 
of special interest respondents.116  Thus, the press asserts that the 
policy has impinged upon the protected freedoms that its members 
enjoy in the United States, rendering it unable to fulfill its mission 
to inform the public effectively about the substance of these 
hearings.117  As a result, two groups of newspaper plaintiffs sought 
to enjoin the DOJ’s use of special interest procedures.118  They did 
 
had applied for full-time residency status).  Haddad’s lapsed visa placed him in violation 
of the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C) (2003). 
111 See Kim Kozlowski & David Shepardson, Ramadan Donors Struggle to Find 
Approved Charities; Some Groups Have Assets Frozen in Terrorism Probe, DETROIT 
NEWS, Nov. 7, 2002, at 1E. 
112 See Sarah Freeman, Man Denies Aiding Al-Qaeda and Asks for U.S. Asylum, PHILA. 
INQUIRER, Oct. 24, 2002, at A16. 
113 Id. 
114 Matt O’Connor & Rudolph Bush, 2 Court Rulings Go Against Leaders of Muslim 
Charities, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 2002, at N15. 
115 See id. 
116 See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 684–85 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(noting the obstacles that media entities faced when trying to gather facts on Haddad’s 
case). 
117 See id. 
118 Id.; see also N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 203–04 (3d Cir. 
2002) (describing the press’s collective preference for case-by-case determinations). 
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not argue for blanket access to immigration courtrooms.119  
Instead, the press sought to restore the power of immigration 
judges to make case-by-case determinations regarding press 
attendance at such proceedings, thus reestablishing a qualified 
right of press access predicated on a balancing of interests.120 
D. Media Plaintiffs Have Sought to Enjoin Enforcement of the 
DOJ’s Special Interest Policy by Securing Injunctions from 
Judicial Branch Courts 
1. Two Federal Cases Have Challenged the Special Interest 
Policy 
Press plaintiffs in Michigan and New Jersey filed suit to 
reinstitute the qualified right of press access to removal 
proceedings restricted by the Creppy Directive.121  In each case, 
the plaintiffs argued that both federal regulations and the First 
Amendment guaranteed press the right to observe such matters, 
unless an immigration judge could find case-specific reasons to 
close a removal proceeding.122 
In North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, the publisher of two 
northern New Jersey daily newspapers joined the New Jersey Law 
Journal in a suit filed with the U.S. District Court for the District 
of New Jersey.123  The plaintiffs sought a nationwide injunction to 
bar implementation of the special interest procedures.124  Although 
 
119 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 684, 692–93; N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 
203–04. 
120 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 684, 692–93; N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 
203–04. 
121 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941–42 (E.D. Mich.), aff’d, 303 
F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002); N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288 
(D.N.J.), rev’d, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).  The two cases commenced before the 
Attorney General issued his order that revised the CFR.  As a result, they do not comport 
with these changes.  On appeal, the Sixth Circuit considered the new provision, whereas 
the Third Circuit ignored it. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d 681; N. Jersey Media 
Group, 308 F.3d 198. 
122 See Detroit Free Press Complaint, supra note 8, at 11–12 (describing the causes of 
action); North Jersey Complaint, supra note 8, at 4–5 (describing the causes of action). 
123 N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 290. 
124 North Jersey Complaint, supra note 8, at 5. 
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the District Court held for the plaintiffs and granted the 
injunction,125 the Third Circuit reversed and held for the DOJ.126  
Plaintiffs in Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft127 sought collectively to 
enjoin enforcement of the Creppy Directive strictly as it related to 
Rabih Haddad’s proceedings; each of the media plaintiffs had been 
barred from Haddad’s removal proceedings because of special 
interest considerations.128  Both the U.S. District Court of the 
Eastern District of Michigan129 and the Sixth Circuit130 sided with 
the plaintiffs, enjoining the closure of Haddad’s hearings through 
use of special interest procedures.  Nevertheless, the immigration 
judge currently presiding over Haddad’s hearings has continued to 
block public access.131 
2. Press Interests Have Relied Both on Regulatory Language 
and the Richmond Newspapers Test to Ground their 
Arguments 
The plaintiffs relied on two different sources of law to pursue 
their claims.  They argued that neither the CFR, nor the First 
Amendment allowed for special interest procedures.  To support 
their CFR argument, the media plaintiffs contended that the special 
interest procedures of the Creppy Directive were incompatible with 
the qualified right of access outlined in the regulation.132  To 
 
125 N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 305–06. 
126 N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 221. 
127 The plaintiffs were the Detroit Free Press, Inc. and Herald Co., Inc., Detroit News, 
Inc., and Metro Times, Inc.  See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 684 n.3. 
128 Id. (stating that the three media plaintiffs filed separate suits that were consolidated 
before trial).  Joining them, as well, were Haddad and Representative John Conyers, 
Democrat-Michigan, ranking member of the Judiciary Committee in the House of 
Representatives, who was barred from attending Haddad’s immigration court hearings.  
Id. at 684. 
129 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 948 (E.D. Mich.), aff’d, 303 
F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). 
130 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 710. 
131 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, No. 02-70339, 2002 WL 31317398, at *1 (E.D. Mich. 
Oct. 7, 2002).  The same immigration judge recently denied Haddad’s asylum claim, thus 
making him eligible for removal under the INA because he has overstayed his visa. 
132 Plaintiffs turned specifically to the language of 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 (1997)—the version 
in place before the Attorney General’s 2002 revisions. Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 
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pursue the constitutional portion of their arguments, both plaintiffs 
relied on the same collection of case law, Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia and its progeny.133 
In Richmond Newspapers, the Supreme Court first articulated a 
generalized test to determine whether the First Amendment grants 
the press presumed rights to observe particular court 
proceedings.134  Since then, the Court has granted such rights to 
media in a number of contexts.135  Six years after Richmond 
Newspapers, in the second of two significant cases entitled Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (“Press-Enterprise II”), Chief 
Justice Warren Burger consolidated the measures relied upon in 
the previous press access cases and established the two-pronged 
“experience and logic” test.136  The experience prong calls on a 
court to consider whether “the place and process have historically 
been open to the press and general public.”137  Under the logic 
prong, a court must examine 
whether public access plays a significant positive role in 
the functioning of the particular process in question. . . . 
Although many governmental processes operate best under 
public scrutiny, it takes little imagination to recognize that 
there are some kinds of government operations that would 
be totally frustrated if conducted openly.138 
 
2d at 941; N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 290 (D.N.J.), rev’d, 
308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002). 
133 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). See also Press-
Enter. Co. v. Sup. Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise I]; Press-
Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
134 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581. 
135 In Richmond Newspapers, the Court confirmed the qualified public access right to 
attend criminal trials.  448 U.S. at 581.  In Globe Newspaper, the Court held statutes 
calling for automatic closure of courtrooms unconstitutional. 457 U.S. at 610–11.  In 
Press-Enterprise I, the Court held that the voir dire portion of jury selection must be 
presumptively open. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 513.  Finally, in Press-Enterprise II, 
the Court extended the qualified press access right to preliminary trial proceedings. 
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 15. 
136 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9. 
137 Id. at 8. 
138 Id. at 8–9 (citations omitted). 
OBERFIELD FORMAT 8/27/03  3:00 PM 
1232 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:1209 
 
Press access can arise only if a given proceeding passes both of the 
test’s prongs.139  The Supreme Court limits the access test, noting 
that even if a proceeding fulfills both of the prongs, the rights of 
the accused or other parties could be “undermined by publicity” in 
certain circumstances.140  In such individual cases, Chief Justice 
Burger notes, the trial court must “determine whether the situation 
is such that the rights . . . override the qualified First Amendment 
right of access.”141 
In the cases before the district courts in Michigan and New 
Jersey, the plaintiffs asserted that the Richmond Newspapers test 
was the appropriate measure to assess access rights to removal 
proceedings.142  Further, they implied that the government’s 
special interest procedures failed to overcome a presumption of 
access because they could not satisfy the traditional test of strict 
scrutiny,143 lacking a narrowly tailored compelling governmental 
objective.144 
 
139 See id. at 9 (“If the particular proceeding in question passes these tests of experience 
and logic, a qualified First Amendment right of public access attaches.”). 
140 Id. 
141 Id.  The Court specified: 
[T]he presumption of [access] may be overcome only by an overriding interest 
based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.  The interest is to be articulated along 
with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the 
closure order was properly entered. 
Id. at 9–10. 
142 See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941–42 (E.D. Mich.), aff’d, 
303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002); N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 
298 (D.N.J.), rev’d, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002). 
143 Courts apply traditional strict scrutiny when employing the Richmond Newspapers 
test because of the Supreme Court’s indication in Globe Newspaper that such an 
approach is appropriate. See N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 301 (citing 
Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07). 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Michigan also distinguished the application of 
strict scrutiny from application of the standard used in U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 
(1968), in cases that implicate the Richmond Newspapers test: 
As the Sixth Circuit explained in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 
F.2d at 1179, there are two broad categories of exceptions to the practice of 
openness in the courtroom: those based on the need to keep order and dignity in 
the courtroom and those which center on the content of the information to be 
disclosed to the public.  The first category may only need to pass the O’Brien 
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3. Media Plaintiffs Win the First Legal Challenge 
In Michigan, media plaintiffs secured their first victory in the 
battle to restore qualified access to special interest removal 
proceedings.  On April 3, 2002, the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan granted a preliminary injunction to 
enjoin the DOJ from closing Rabih Haddad’s hearings via 
enforcement of the Creppy Directive.145  The court first determined 
that the Richmond Newspapers line of cases applied to removal 
proceedings,146 and also found that removal proceedings pass the 
experience and logic test.147  Thereafter, it determined that the 
Creppy Directive was not narrowly tailored as a legitimate 
exception to the expectation of openness.148  As such, the court 
found that closure of Haddad’s hearings violated the First 
Amendment, and the court ordered Haddad’s hearings reopened.149 
In making the initial determination to use the Richmond 
Newspapers test, the Michigan court considered it important that 
the Sixth Circuit applied the test to analyze a separate press access 
claim.150  Once committed to the Richmond Newspapers test, the 
 
test; however, as to the second category, “only the most compelling reasons” 
can justify closure. 
Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 945 n.8 (citation omitted). 
144 See Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 946–47 (detailing the court’s application 
of the strict scrutiny standard to the facts). See also N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 
2d at 301–02 (providing similar analysis). 
145 Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 948.  The court considered the following four 
factors when deciding to apply a preliminary injunction: “(1) whether the movant has a 
strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would suffer 
irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether issuance of the injunction would 
cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether public interest would be served by 
issuance of the injunction.” Id. at 942 (citing Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 809 (6th 
Cir. 2001)). 
146 Id. at 942.  The court opted to separate the plaintiff’s claim under the CFR from its 
First Amendment analysis; instead, the court incorporated the CFR’s language into its 
analysis of the Richmond Newspapers’ experience prong. Id. at 943. 
147 Id. at 943–44. 
148 Id. at 946–47. 
149 Id. at 947–48. 
150 Id. at 942.  The Sixth Circuit used the test when assessing whether newspapers could 
challenge closure of a summary jury proceeding.  “First the proceeding must be one for 
which there has been a ‘tradition of accessibility”“ and “[s]econd, public access must 
play a ‘significant positive role’ in the function of the particular process in question.” Id. 
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court then established that removal proceedings historically 
operated under a clear presumption of openness.151  The court 
remarked that while exclusion hearings have been closed expressly 
by statute and regulation, deportation hearings have never been 
addressed in federal statute and that “INS regulations for almost 
fifty years have mandated that deportation proceedings be 
presumptively open.”152 
The court then turned to the logic prong of the Richmond 
Newspapers test, noting that, “when governmental agencies 
adjudicate or make binding determinations which directly affect 
the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies 
use the procedures which have traditionally been associated with 
the judicial process.”153  The court added that open removal 
proceedings, “especially those in which the life or liberty of an 
individual is at stake, should be subject to public scrutiny, not only 
for the protection of the individual from unwarranted and arbitrary 
conviction, but also to protect the public from lax prosecution.”154  
Because Haddad’s right to remain in the United States would be 
decided in the removal proceedings, the court found it logically 
imperative to keep immigration courts presumptively open.155 
 
at 942 (citations omitted) (quoting Cincinnati Gas and Elec. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 854 
F.2d 900, 903 (6th Cir 1988)). 
151 Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 942. 
152 See Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 943.  Although Haddad’s case has 
unfolded in the aftermath of the IIRIRA, courts have continued to distinguish between 
those cases that would have fit within the deportation category and those that would have 
been exclusion hearings.  Haddad’s hearing clearly falls into the deportation category 
because Haddad had acquired legal status in the United States by way of the visa that he 
overstayed, and he had established residency. 
153 Id. at 943–44 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 
154 Id. at 944 (quoting Pechter v. Lyons, 441 F. Supp. 115, 117–18 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)). 
155 See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 947 (E.D. Mich.), aff’d, 303 
F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).  The court noted: 
It is important for the public . . . to know that even during these sensitive times 
the Government is adhering to immigration procedures and respecting 
individuals’ rights. . . .  [S]ecrecy only breeds suspicion as to why the 
government is proceeding against Haddad and aliens like him.  And if in fact 
the Government determines that Haddad is connected to terrorist activity or 
organizations, a decision made openly concerning his deportation may assure 
the public that justice has been done. 
Id. at 944. 
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After determining that removal proceedings satisfied both 
prongs of the Richmond Newspapers test, the court then decided 
that the government could not fit the Creppy Directive within the 
test’s exception that allows for narrowly tailored measures that 
fulfill compelling governmental objectives.156  The court first 
found that the government failed to demonstrate a compelling 
governmental objective because it spoke only in generalities about 
the potential terror threats that would arise by opening Haddad’s 
hearing.157  The court then concluded that the government’s effort 
to protect the courtroom was ineffective because attorneys and 
clients could discuss matters outside of the courtroom,158 and 
because the press already had reported extensively upon the 
case.159  Therefore, the Creppy Directive failed the narrow 
tailoring requirement.160  As a result, the Michigan court held that 
the immigration court must open Haddad’s hearings.161 
4. The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey 
Grants the Media Plaintiffs a Second Significant Victory 
Shortly after the Michigan court issued its injunction, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Jersey also enjoined 
implementation of the Creppy Directive,162 but its analysis differed 
 
156 Id. at 947.  The government did not concede that the Creppy Directive could apply 
only if it was narrowly tailored to fulfill a compelling governmental interest (the strict 
scrutiny measure). Id. at 944–47.  The court, however, did not support this stance. Id. at 
947. 
157 Id. at 946–47. 
158 Id. at 947.  The Attorney General incorporated language into 8 C.F.R. § 3.46  (1997) 
(current version at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46 (2003)) to close this loophole. 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. at 947–48.  After the District Court denied reconsideration on April 3, 2002, the 
government appealed to the Sixth Circuit for a stay, pending appeal. Id. at 948.  It granted 
a temporary stay, but dissolved it shortly thereafter while denying the government’s 
motion for stay pending appeal. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-1437 (6th Cir. 
Apr. 10, 2002), at 2002 WL 1332827; Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-1437 
(6th Cir. Apr. 18, 2002), at 2002 WL 1332836. 
162 N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 305 (D.N.J.), rev’d, 308 
F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).  The court required that the plaintiffs meet a slightly different 
standard for an injunction than that employed in Detroit Free Press: 
(1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the 
merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the 
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significantly from that of the Michigan court.  In New Jersey, the 
court dealt separately with the plaintiffs’ causes of action under the 
First Amendment and the CFR,163 whereas Michigan’s court 
combined the two issues. 
As in Detroit Free Press, the court first concluded that the 
Richmond Newspapers test applied to this case, and then used the 
test to determine that a First Amendment right of access had been 
infringed upon by the special interest policy.164  The New Jersey 
court found it significant that other courts had used the test in non-
criminal contexts.165  The court then considered the facts before it 
in terms of experience and logic.  As for the experience prong, the 
court traced qualified openness in removal proceedings to 
Yamataya v. Fisher,166 which guaranteed non-citizens due process 
 
relief; (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to 
the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in 
the public interest. 
Id. at 296 (citing Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999)).  
The court will issue an injunction only if all four prongs are met. See id. (citing Merchant 
Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods., 963 F.2d 628, 632–33 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting 
Opticians Ass’n v. Indep. Opticians, 920 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1990))). 
163 See id. at 302–04.  Still, as in the Michigan case, the court also used the CFR to 
bolster its experience prong analysis under the Richmond Newspapers test. Id. at 300. 
164 Id. at 298–302. 
165 Id. at 299–300.  In deciding that the Richmond  Newspapers line applied, the court 
also stressed that the experience and logic test has been employed in settings other than 
criminal court: 
Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984) (extending 
Richmond Newspapers rationale to civil trials); Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. W. 
Whiteland, 193 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying test to find right of 
access to municipal planning meeting); Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of 
Agric., 960 F.2d 105, 109 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying test to administrative voter 
list); Soc’y of Prof. Journalists v. Sec’y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 574 (D. 
Utah 1985) (applying test to administrative hearing). 
Id. at 300. 
 Nevertheless, the government suggested that the “facially legitimate and bona fide” 
standard of Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972), provided the proper 
measure because Congress has plenary power over immigration matters.  Yet, the New 
Jersey court distinguished Kleindienst because it pertained to an individual who had not 
yet entered the United States, and thus was not afforded the due process rights granted to 
those already in the United States. N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 296–98. 
166 189 U.S. 86 (1903). 
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when facing removal.167  As for the logic prong, the court noted 
that: 
deportation proceedings inherently involve a governmental 
process that affects a person’s liberty interest[.] . . . Thus, 
the ultimate individual stake in these proceedings is the 
same as or greater than in criminal proceedings or civil 
actions[, and] . . . the same functional goals served by 
openness in the civil and criminal judicial contexts would 
be equally served in the context of deportation hearings.168 
After concluding that the Richmond Newspapers test applies to 
removal proceedings that pertain to deportation, the court 
concluded that the Creppy Directive lacked the narrow tailoring 
necessary to fulfill a compelling governmental interest.169  As 
such, the government could not overcome the presumption of 
openness tied to the proceedings.170  The court divided the 
government’s interests into two pools: “(1) avoidance of setbacks 
to its terrorism investigation caused by open hearings; and (2) 
prevention of stigma or harm to detainees that might result if 
hearings were open.”171  The court did not directly assess whether 
these interests met the compelling interest standard,172 but focused 
instead on the narrow tailoring requirement.173  Echoing the 
Michigan court’s analysis in Detroit Free Press, the court found 
 
167 See N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 300 (highlighting that the CFR’s 
consistent call for presumptively open removal proceedings since 1964, added further 
substance to the experience analysis). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. at 301–02. 
171 Id. at 301. 
172 Id. at 301–02. Essentially, the court merged its analysis of the government’s 
objectives and the Creppy Directive’s tailoring.  As such, the court neglected to weigh the 
first prong of the government’s burden at all, and only alluded to the flaws of the 
government’s attempt to meet their second prong burden within its commentary on 
tailoring. Id. 
173 Id.  The court implied that if the government had allowed for case-by-case in camera 
review of allegedly sensitive information, the government would have fulfilled the 
narrow tailoring requirement.  Nevertheless, because the court does not make clear 
whether both of the government’s interests were compelling, one cannot discern whether 
the government could have satisfied the strict scrutiny test if it had adopted the case-by-
case approach. Id. 
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that because the respondents and lawyers could speak openly about 
removal proceedings outside the court, the Creppy Directive 
lacked sufficient narrowness.174  The court further noted that, “to 
the extent that the Creppy [Directive] is said to serve the interest of 
insulating the individual detainee from humiliation or stigma,” it 
exhibits excessive breadth because it prohibits respondents from 
keeping their proceedings open if that is what they would prefer.175 
Nevertheless, after the court dismissed the government’s 
special interest policy on First Amendment grounds, it held that the 
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate an access right through strict 
reliance on the CFR.176  The court stated that, “neither the 
regulations themselves nor their enabling statutes expressly 
provide a right of enforcement through a civil action for perceived 
violations.”177  Specifically, the court deferred to Alexander v. 
Sandoval,178 where the Supreme Court disallowed third parties 
from enforcing regulations when Congress has not created such a 
right.179  Without a “‘freestanding’ cause of action” drafted for 
their use, the plaintiffs stood powerless to enforce the qualified 
access right that the regulations permitted.180  Therefore, even 
though the court thought it appropriate to refer to the CFR in its 
Richmond Newspapers analysis, it would not affirm a right of 
access grounded in the public’s enforcement of regulatory 
language.181 
Yet the court granted the plaintiffs the injunction they sought 
because it concluded that a First Amendment calculus requires 
presumptive openness for removal proceedings, and that the 
 
174 Id. at 301 (noting accord with Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937 
(E.D. Mich.), aff’d, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002)). 
175 Id. at 302. 
176 Id. at 303–04.  The court specifically referred to 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 (1997) (currently 
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27 (2003)) in its analysis. 
177 See N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 303. 
178 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
179 See N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 303 (“Without it, a cause of action 
does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a 
policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”) (quoting Alexander, 532 U.S. at 290–
91). 
180 Id. (citing Alexander, 532 U.S. at 286–87). 
181 See id at 304. 
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Creppy Directive is not narrowly tailored to overcome that 
presumption.182  Significantly, in N. Jersey Media the court’s 
holding expanded upon the Detroit Free Press court’s holding 
because it imposed an injunction nationally, rather than on a 
specific special interest proceeding. 
The optimism of the media plaintiffs waned after the victory in 
New Jersey because the Supreme Court stayed the district court’s 
decision, pending a decision in the Third Circuit.183  Although the 
Court provided no rationale for its stay,184 it seems likely that 
Attorney General Ashcroft’s order that altered the CFR, issued on 
May 28, 2002,185 played an influential role.  The U.S. District 
Court for the District of New Jersey published its opinion on the 
same day that the order was issued, but the Attorney General 
retroactively dated the order to May 21.186 
5. The Sixth Circuit Affirms, Bestowing upon the Public a 
Qualified Right to Access Haddad’s Hearings 
Despite the setback for media plaintiffs in the North Jersey 
Media case, the Sixth Circuit soon affirmed the earlier decision of 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in 
Detroit Free Press.  Although the court looked anew at the 
questions of law,187 it enjoined use of special interest procedures as 
 
182 The court assessed each of the four factors required for an injunction, based upon 
Allegheny Energy Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999), and found that the 
plaintiffs’ claim satisfied all of them. Id. at 304–05. 
183 Ashcroft v. N. Jersey Media Group, 536 U.S. 954 (2002) (mem.). 
184 The Supreme Court issued a brief statement in issuing its stay of the injunction, 
pending the outcome of the appeal to the Third Circuit: 
Application for stay presented to Justice SOUTER and by him referred to the 
Court granted, and it is ordered that the preliminary injunction entered by the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on May 28, 2002, is 
stayed pending the final disposition of the government’s appeal of that 
injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
Id. 
185 Att’y Gen. Order No. 2585-2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,799 (May 28, 2002). 
186 Id. 
187 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 685 (6th Cir. 2002) (“We review the 
grant of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion, but questions of law are 
reviewed de novo.”) (quoting Gonzales v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 225 F.3d 620, 625 
(6th Cir. 2000)). 
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they applied to Haddad.188  Like the district court, the Sixth Circuit 
framed its analysis on the plaintiffs’ First Amendment query and 
decided first that the Richmond Newspapers test applied.189  The 
Sixth Circuit next employed the experience and logic analysis in 
which the court established the existence of a qualified public 
access right.190  Finally, the Sixth Circuit determined that the 
Creppy Directive lacked the narrow tailoring necessary to 
overcome the access right.191  This analysis is distinguished from 
the analysis used in Detroit Free Press, which granted equal 
weight to the First Amendment query and the express language of 
the CFR. 
In structuring its analysis, the Sixth Circuit initially determined 
that access to removal proceedings should be evaluated under 
Richmond Newspapers, and that such proceedings must operate 
under presumptive openness if they satisfy the experience and 
logic prongs.192  After considering the government’s contention 
that the Richmond Newspapers test pertains only to judicial branch 
criminal proceedings,193 the court concluded that Richmond 
Newspapers applied because courts have applied the test in other 
contexts194 and because the government produced no case law 
 
188 Id. at 681. 
189 Id. at 696. 
190 Id. at 700. 
191 Id. at 711. 
192 Id. at 696, 700. 
193 The court initially considered the government’s contention that the Kleindienst 
standard should apply to removal proceedings generally because of the government’s 
plenary powers.  Yet the Sixth Circuit followed its own district court and the U.S. District 
Court for the District of New Jersey in declaring that Kleindienst did not apply to 
removal proceedings because of due process implications.  The court noted, “It would be 
ironic, indeed, to allow the government’s assertion of plenary power to transform the 
First Amendment from the great instrument of open democracy to a safe harbor from 
public scrutiny.” Id. at 686. 
194 Like the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, the Sixth Circuit cited 
examples of cases outside of the criminal context in which courts applied the Richmond 
Newspapers test.  They include: 
United States v. Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 824 (6th Cir. 2002) (university’s 
student disciplinary board proceedings); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 
v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177–79 (6th Cir. 1983) (civil action 
against administrative agency); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 
(3d Cir. 1984) (civil trial); Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. W. Whiteland, 193 F.3d 
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supporting its premise.195  Moreover, the court highlighted close 
similarities between removal proceedings and criminal 
proceedings—the latter representing the context in which the 
Supreme Court applied the Richmond Newspapers test.196  
Specifically, the court emphasized the quasi-judicial structure of 
removal proceedings, including the Notice that initiates 
proceedings and the government’s burden of presenting clear and 
convincing evidence.197 
After determining that the Richmond Newspapers test applied, 
the Sixth Circuit turned its attention to the experience prong, 
finding that removal proceedings historically have operated under 
a presumption of openness.198  The court observed that the 
Supreme Court requires a period of established routine to fulfill the 
experience criterion, but does not require centuries of tradition.199  
Turning to the specific history of removal proceedings, the court 
decided that the CFR has “explicitly required deportation 
proceedings to be presumptively open” for more than thirty years, 
and that Congress has revised the INA more than fifty times 
without “indicating that [the executive branch] had judged their 
intent incorrectly.”200  Moreover, Congress has enacted statutes 
 
177, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (municipal planning meeting); Cal-Almond, Inc. v. U.S. 
Dept. of Agric., 960 F.2d 105, 109 (9th Cir. 1992) (agriculture department’s 
voters list); Soc’y of Prof. Journalists v. Sec’y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 574 
(D. Utah 1985) (administrative hearing), vacated as moot, 832 F.2d 1180 (10th 
Cir. 1987). 
Id. at 695. 
 The court also added that in a Richmond Newspapers concurring opinion, Justice 
Stevens wrote, “[t]he First Amendment protects the public and the press from 
abridgement of their rights of access to information about the operation of their 
government, including the Judicial Branch.”) (emphasis added). Id. 
195 Id. at 695. 
196 Id. at 698. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 700–03. 
199 Id. at 700.  The court stated that in Press-Enterprise II, the Supreme Court strictly 
relied on “post-Bill of Rights history in determining that preliminary hearings in criminal 
cases were historically open.” Id.  The court also mentioned that several circuit courts 
have labeled procedures as presumptively open even if they lack the historical openness 
that would satisfy the Richmond Newspapers experience prong. Id. at 700. 
200 Id. at 701. 
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that have kept exclusion hearings closed.201  The court also noted 
that while removal proceedings have operated openly for 
approximately thirty years within the modern administrative state, 
open proceedings also existed in the common law’s closest 
analog.202 
The Sixth Circuit next examined the Richmond Newspapers 
logic prong and found that removal proceedings satisfied this 
requirement as well.  The court asserted that “public access acts as 
a check on the actions of the Executive by assuring us that 
proceedings are conducted fairly and properly,”203 and that it 
encourages scrutiny so that government “does not make 
mistakes.”204  The court added that because the government does 
not guarantee counsel for respondents in removal proceedings, the 
press and public “may be [the aliens’] only guardian[s].”205  The 
court also found that open hearings “may assure the public that 
justice has been done,” and that they enhance the likelihood that 
the government will abide by established procedures.206  Finally, 
the court asserted that public access keeps the American citizenry 
informed about the affairs of its government so that it can “affirm 
or protest” its efforts.207 
After determining that the removal proceedings satisfied the 
two prongs of the Richmond Newspapers test, the court concluded 
that the Creppy Directive, and the order that modified it, 
collectively lacked narrow tailoring to fulfill a compelling 
governmental interest.208  In turn, this prevented the government 
from overcoming the presumption of openness that Richmond 
Newspapers mandates.209  Unlike the U.S. District Court for the 
 
201 See id. (discussing statutory enactments from the Nineteenth Century). 
202 Id. at 702.  In a procedure dating to the Eighteenth Century, England’s open criminal 
courts banished individuals to the American Colonies, among other destinations. Id. 
203 Id. at 703–04. 




208 Id. at 707–10. 
209 Id. at 710.  The court also argued that, irrespective of strict scrutiny concerns, the 
Creppy Directive could not fit within an exception to the Richmond Newspapers test 
because it does not require the immigration judge to make specific, on-the-record 
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Eastern District of Michigan, the Sixth Circuit held that the 
government presented a compelling governmental interest 
“sufficient to justify closure.”210 
Despite this, the court found that the Creppy Directive failed to 
exhibit narrow tailoring because of both under-breadth and over-
breadth.  This means that parts of Creppy Directive allowed the 
government more latitude than necessary to fulfill its compelling 
objective, while other aspects of it were not sufficiently inclusive 
in this regard.211  As for under-breadth, the Sixth Circuit echoed 
the lower court by underscoring the ability of respondents and 
attorneys to comment on their trials outside the courtroom.212  The 
court acknowledged that the Attorney General had crafted his 
order to solve this matter, but argued that the proposed solution 
impermissibly restrained speech.213  The court stated that, “these 
prohibitions are impermissible to the extent that they indefinitely 
restrain a deportee’s ability to divulge all information, including 
information obtained independently from the deportation 
proceedings.”214  As a result, the court construed the regulations as 
binding on attorneys and respondents only during the duration of 
their removal proceedings.215 
Regarding the Creppy Directive’s over-breadth, the court stated 
that an immigration judge could make case-by-case determinations 
to avoid the blanket closure that the Creppy Directive mandates.216  
 
findings to justify the closure of an immigration court—and the court determined that 
Press-Enterprise II insists on such procedure. See id. at 707 (citing Press-Enterprise II, 
478 U.S. 1 (1986)). 
210 Id. at 705–06.  The court cited, among other issues, the mosaic theory that the 
Attorney General had emphasized in the order that codified the Creppy Directive. Id. 
211 Id. at 710. 
212 Id. at 707–08. 
213 Id. 
214 See id. at 708 (noting that it violates the First Amendment to bar a witness from 
revealing his own testimony after a grand jury concludes) (citing Butterworth v. Smith, 
494 U.S. 624, 632 (1990).  The court also found the order improper because it restricts 
dissemination of respondents’ names, the locations of their arrests, and dates of their 
arrests—information unrelated to their actual proceedings. Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id.  Although the Court does not directly address the ways in which 8 C.F.R. § 
1003.46 (2003) affects the discretion of immigration judges to close their own courts on 
OBERFIELD FORMAT 8/27/03  3:00 PM 
1244 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:1209 
 
The court also observed that, to remove an alien, the government 
typically does not require presentation of evidence related to 
national security.217  In Haddad’s case, the government sought 
removal merely because Haddad overstayed his tourist visa.218  
The court added that, just because the mosaic theory provided the 
government with a compelling interest, logic required an 
immigration judge to make specific findings.  To do otherwise 
could lead the government to close any public hearing, including 
criminal judicial proceedings protected by Richmond 
Newspapers.219  As a result, the court proscribed enforcement of 
the special interest procedures that barred the press from Haddad’s 
removal hearings.220 
6. Despite the Sixth Circuit’s Decision in Favor of Media 
Interests, Haddad’s Hearings Have Remained Closed 
Press plaintiffs secured another victory for public access 
because the government did not convince the Sixth Circuit that the 
Creppy Directive fit the strict scrutiny exception under the 
Richmond Newspapers test; nevertheless, they celebrated only 
briefly because Haddad’s hearings were closed again.  Following 
the Sixth Circuit’s affirmation of the district court’s injunction, 
Haddad sought and secured a preliminary injunction requiring a 
new removal hearing that would be presumptively open to the 
 
case-by-case bases, it seems evident that the court approves only of a case-by-case model 
that fully empowers immigration judges. 
217 Id. at 709. 
218 Id. (“To deport an overstay, the INS must convince the immigration judge by clear 
and convincing evidence that the alien was admitted as a non-immigrant for a specific 
period, that the period has elapsed, and that the alien is still in this country.”) (citing 
Shahla v. Immigration and Nationalization Serv., 749 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1984)). 
219 Id. at 709–10.  The court observed that logical extension of the mosaic theory 
argument would lead even to closed criminal proceedings in judicial courts, which would 
result in “wholesale suspension of First Amendment rights.” Id. 
220 Id. at 683.  The court suggested that the special interest policy would “uproot 
people’s lives, outside the public eye, and behind a closed door.  Democracies die behind 
closed doors.”  Moreover, it emphasized that the public “deputiz[es] the press as the 
guardians of their liberty.” Id. 
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public.221  Immigration Judge Robert Newberry replaced 
Immigration Judge Elizabeth Hacker, Haddad’s former 
immigration judge in subsequent proceedings.222 
Yet, when Judge Newberry commenced Haddad’s proceeding 
on October 1, 2002, he closed the doors of his immigration court 
without providing an on-the-record rationale.223  During a closed 
meeting held the morning before the hearing, Judge Newberry 
reviewed the information the government had sought to introduce 
and opted for closure at that time.224  Media plaintiffs immediately 
sought relief from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan.225  The court held that Judge Newberry had the right to 
close the proceeding, but that he had violated the procedure 
designated by the Sixth Circuit because he did not allow Haddad’s 
counsel to challenge the closure, nor did he render particularized 
on-the-record findings.226  As a result, the district court held that 
the immigration court must follow the Sixth Circuit’s procedure in 
the future, but that Judge Newberry had properly closed the 
courtroom on October 1, because of the sensitive evidence that the 
government had introduced.227 
 
221 See Haddad v. Ashcroft, 221 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D. Mich.) (holding that denial of a 
hearing before a new immigration judge would undermine Haddad’s due process rights), 
aff’d sub nom. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). 
222 Steve Fainaru, Detainee to Get Open Immigration Hearing; Justice Department Still 
Plans Appeal of Ruling for Muslim Activist Held 9 Months, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2002, 
at A13. 
223 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-70339, 2002 WL 31317398, at *1 (E.D. 
Mich. Oct. 7, 2002). 
224 Id.  The parties’ briefs do not make clear whether Haddad’s counsel also attended 
this meeting. Id at *1 n.1. 
225 Detroit Free Press, 2002 WL 31317398, at *1. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at *1–*2.  The prohibition on special interest tactics remains intact in the Sixth 
Circuit.  In January, the Sixth Circuit denied the government’s request for a rehearing of 
its case, as well as its request for a rehearing en banc. See O’Connor & Bush, supra note 
115, at N15. 
 Despite the Sixth Circuit’s clear opposition to the special interest procedures, 
Haddad’s case apparently is not the only one in the Sixth Circuit that has been 
categorically closed to the public in spite of the court’s decision last August.  Ziad Anton 
Hatter, a 31-year-old Jordanian, was detained in Ohio last year, at the request of the INS, 
without being charged.  Hatter entered the country using false travel documents, and all 
of his immigration proceedings, as of Jan. 21, 2003, have been closed to the public.  
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As of this publication, Haddad’s case remains unresolved.  
Judge Newberry recently denied Haddad’s asylum request and 
ordered the removal of Haddad, his wife, and three of his four 
children.228  Haddad is appealing the decision to the BIA,229 but 
has remained jailed during this process.230 
7. The Third Circuit Deals the Media Plaintiffs Another 
Defeat 
The Third Circuit also considered the question of access to 
removal proceedings, but, unlike the Sixth Circuit, the court 
declined to follow its lower court and instead permitted 
enforcement of the Creppy Directive.231  The court concluded that 
while the Richmond Newspapers test applies to removal 
proceedings as a means of determining rights of public access,232 
removal proceedings fail the test’s experience and logic prongs.233  
As a result, the court did not find a presumptive right of access, 
which led it to determine that First Amendment considerations 
would play no role in its decision to overturn the nationwide 
injunction on the Creppy Directive.234 
First, the Third Circuit followed the U.S. District Court for the 
District of New Jersey and found that the Richmond Newspapers 
test extends beyond criminal proceedings to include removal 
proceedings.  Significantly, the court cited use of Richmond 
 
Hatter remained in INS custody as of Jan. 21, 2003. See Bill Sloat, Detained; Jordanian 
at Center of Dispute—Case Is Now a Fight on Post-9/11 Policy, CLEVELAND PLAIN 
DEALER, Jan 22, 2003, at A6. 
228 David Shepardson, Islamic Charity Founder Pleads for Political Asylum; U.S. Has 
Yet to Charge Haddad in Terror Link, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 21, 2002, at 1C. Orders of 
removal can extend, as in Haddad’s case, to alien family members.  Three of Haddad’s 
children are aliens, while the fourth is American and cannot be removed. Id. 
229 See Associated Press, Islamic Charity Chief Fights Deportation; Lebanese Citizen Is 
Being Held on Visa Violation, Dec. 27, 2002, at 7. 
230 See id. 
231 See N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 204–09 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the Third Circuit majority failed to address the Attorney 
General’s order.  Thus, the opinion dealt only with the Creppy Directive. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. at 202. 
234 Id. at 220–21. 
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Newspapers in civil proceedings,235 and in the administrative 
context.236  The Third Circuit concluded that, these “precedents 
demonstrate that in this [c]ourt, Richmond Newspapers is a test 
broadly applicable to issues of access to government proceedings, 
including removal.”237 
Once the Third Circuit committed to a Richmond Newspapers 
analysis, the court concluded that removal proceedings failed the 
history prong because they have not been traditionally accessible 
to the public.238  The court emphasized that Congress never passed 
statutory language requiring public access to removal 
proceedings,239 even if executive branch regulations have afforded 
a rebuttable presumption of access since 1964.240  The court stated 
that, “by insisting on a strong tradition of public access in the 
Richmond Newspapers test, we preserve administrative flexibility 
and avoid constitutionalizing ambiguous, and potentially 
unconsidered, executive decisions.”241 
The court also concluded that removal proceedings failed to 
satisfy the standards of the Richmond Newspapers logic prong 
because of the risks in publicizing information that the government 
deems special interest.242  The court pronounced that the logic 
prong required it “to consider whether public access plays a 
 
235 The court cited Publicker Indus. Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984), in 
which the Third Circuit extended the First Amendment right of access to civil trials. Id. at 
207–08. 
236 Id. at 208. As an example, the court illustrated that in Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. 
Chester, 797 F.2d 1164 (3d Cir. 1986), the Third Circuit had applied the Richmond 
Newspapers test to determine whether the press could access an administrative agency’s 
records. Id. 
237 Id. at 208–09. 
238 Id. at 211 (“[T]he tradition of open deportation hearings is too recent and 
inconsistent to support a First Amendment right of access.”). 
239 Id. at 213 (stating that “we are unwilling effectively to craft a constitutional right 
from mere Congressional silence”). 
240 Id. at 201.  The court argued further that, even if a rebuttable presumption alone were 
sufficient to fulfill the Richmond Newspapers history prong, the rebuttable presumption 
in removal proceedings has not always been maintained.  Removal proceedings have 
taken place frequently in closed settings such as prisons, hospitals and private homes, 
without an initial expectation of public access. Id. at 212. 
241 Id. at 216. 
242 Id. at 216–20. 
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significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process 
in question.”243  Although the circuit court recognized that the 
district court had addressed safety concerns within its strict 
scrutiny analysis, the circuit court found it more appropriate to 
incorporate such issues in a logic prong analysis.244 
The Third Circuit found that the mosaic theory, on its own, 
provided a significant reason to close removal proceedings.245  As 
a result, the “Third Circuit concluded that it was in the 
government’s best interest not to know what was happening in the 
closed proceedings due to the national security concerns.”246  
Moreover, although the court acknowledged that it could only 
speculate that closure would prevent terrorist attacks, the court 
asserted that “courts have traditionally extended great deference to 
Executive expertise” when handling national security matters.247  
Because the circuit court concluded that removal proceedings 
failed to satisfy the Richmond Newspapers test, it overturned the 
injunction instituted by the district court.248 
8. The Dissent Argued that Richmond Newspapers Dictates a 
Qualified Right of Public Access to Removal Proceedings 
Although the Third Circuit confirmed that the government 
could employ the Creppy Directive, Judge Anthony J. Scirica 
dissented from his two colleagues in the majority because he 
thought they mishandled the Richmond Newspapers test.249  In his 
dissent, Judge Scirica found that removal proceedings satisfied the 
 
243 Id. at 216 (citing Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)) (emphasis added). 
244 Id. at 216–17. 
245 Id. at 217–19. 
246 Eve Burton, Access to Special Interest Deportation Proceedings, MEDIA L. RES. 
CENT. BULL., Jan. 2003, at 55, 64. 
247 N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 219. 
248 Id. at 221 (Scirica, J., dissenting).  Significantly, the court confined application of its 
decision to those cases the DOJ labels as special interest, although its analysis under the 
Richmond Newspapers test pertained to removal proceedings generally. Id. at 220 
(Scirica, J., dissenting).  Because the court did not find an access right, it saw no reason 
to consider whether the Creppy Directive satisfied strict scrutiny, or whether the lower 
court had overstepped its bounds by instituting a nationwide injunction. 
249 Id. at 221 (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
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Richmond Newspapers test,250 and that the Creppy Directive 
lacked the required narrow tailoring to overcome the existing 
presumption of public access.251 
First, Judge Scirica insisted that his colleagues had been too 
demanding in their application of the Richmond Newspapers 
experience prong, and that in reality, open removal proceedings 
have strong roots.252  Like his colleagues, Judge Scirica conceded 
that Congress had not explicitly opened deportation proceedings.253  
Nevertheless, Judge Scirica stated that deportation hearings have 
been presumptively open for a century254 and that the DOJ 
incorporated this presumption of openness into the CFR in 1964.255  
He added that because Richmond Newspapers only demanded “a 
qualified right of access . . . which may be restricted by a 
countervailing public interest,”256 the history of removal 
proceedings has demonstrated openness sufficient to satisfy the 
Richmond Newspapers experience prong.257 
Judge Scirica distinguished his analysis of the logic prong from 
that of his colleagues because he thought they had unreasonably 
limited their consideration to special interest circumstances, rather 
than those that pertain to removal proceedings generally.258  “The 
logic analysis set forth by the Supreme Court is directed at a 
particular structural type of proceeding—in this case, deportation 
hearings—not a subset based on specific designations such as 
terrorism.”259  Judge Scirica conceded that if the logic prong 
focused solely on special interest cases, then security concerns 
 
250 Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
251 Id. at 228 (Scirica, J., dissenting).  Like the majority, Judge Scirica failed to consider 
the impact of the Attorney General’s order in his analysis. 
252 Id. at 222 (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
253 Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
254 Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
255 Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
256 Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
257 Id. at 224 (Scirica, J., dissenting).  Judge Scirica noted that “this century of unbroken 
openness, especially within the nascent tradition of the administrative state, ‘implies the 
favorable judgment of experience’ under the Richmond Newspapers test.” Id. (Scirica, J., 
dissenting) (citation omitted). 
258 Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
259 Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
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would outweigh public access rights.260  He argued, however, that 
the Richmond Newspapers test requires a court to consider the 
whole proceeding when contemplating logic, and in this broader 
light, removal proceedings satisfied the logic prong.261 
After concluding that removal proceedings operated under a 
qualified First Amendment right of access, Judge Scirica followed 
the district court and would have overturned the Creppy 
Directive.262  Like the majority, Judge Scirica found that the 
district court had unreasonably dismissed the compelling 
governmental objective of national security.263  Nevertheless, he 
determined that the Creppy Directive’s “blanket closure rule” 
removed decision-making powers from immigration judges who 
could make case-by-case judgments instead—even on issues 
pertinent to national security.264 
Although Judge Scirica could not convince his fellow panelists 
to follow his logic in the Third Circuit’s holding, media plaintiffs 
had hoped that, upon reevaluation, the court would reinstitute the 
injunction imposed by the U.S. District Court for the District of 
New Jersey.265  The ACLU, representing the North Jersey Media 
Group and the New Jersey Law Journal, filed a petition on 
 
260 Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting).  Judge Scirica clarified: 
At this stage, we must consider the value of openness in deportation hearings 
generally, not its benefits and detriments in “special interest” deportation cases 
in particular.  If a qualified right of access is found to attach to deportation 
hearings generally, the analysis then turns to whether particular issues raised in 
individual cases override the general limited right of access. 
Id. at 225 (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
261 Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
262 Id. at 228–29 (Scirica, J., dissenting).  Judge Scirica remarked, however, that he 
would have limited the injunction to the newspaper plaintiffs rather than follow the lower 
court and apply it nationwide, and that expanding it more broadly constituted an abuse of 
discretion. 
263 Id. at 226 (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
264 Id. at 228 (Scirica, J., dissenting).  Judge Scirica asserted that if immigration judges 
afford due deference to INS counsel, immigration judges still can close proceedings that 
involve sensitive information.  To convince immigration judges that they should close 
proceedings, government counselors are free to raise the mosaic theory or any other 
arguments they might consider persuasive. Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
265 See Kibret Markos, U.S. Court Asked to Reconsider Secret Deportation Hearings, 
RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Nov. 23, 2002, at A6. 
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November 22, 2002 with the Third Circuit, seeking 
reconsideration.266  The ACLU claimed that the Third Circuit’s 
decision conflicted with previous holdings of the Supreme Court, 
as well as with the Sixth Circuit’s decision.267  On December 4, 
2002, however, the Third Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ motion.268 
III. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SPECIAL INTEREST POLICY 
MUST BE OVERTURNED IN FAVOR OF A CASE-BY-CASE APPROACH 
A. The Fairest Solution 
The restoration of case-by-case decision-making powers to 
immigration judges would most equitably resolve the dispute 
between the government and the press concerning the special 
interest policy.269  The government should be compelled to 
demonstrate that there are specific reasons for its actions, rather 
than relying on “conclusory, vague and general” statements.270  
The special interest policy deeply undermines the balance between 
the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the press to disseminate 
information on the public’s behalf271 and the government’s interest 
 
266 See id. 
267 See Scott Fallon, Court Snubs ACLU on Secret Hearings; Rejects Petition for Sept. 
11 Detainees, RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Dec. 5, 2002, at A10. 
268 Id.  According to Deborah Jacobs, executive director of the ACLU of New Jersey, “It 
wasn’t the outcome we asked for, but we still have the high court.” Id. 
269 Eve Burton, supra note 246, at 55.  Ms. Burton has supported this outcome, as well, 
noting that “while [it] may be tedious for the government and resource intensive for the 
press, it is the right mandate for a country that has respect for both national security and 
the right of the press and public to know about its government’s activities.” Id. 
Attorney Paul Smith of Jenner & Block echoed Burton’s sentiment, noting that: 
Some guy in Washington just is checking cases on a list and . . . we don’t get to 
have any inquiry into how that decision was made.  . . .  [W]e ought to insist on 
the principle that the government has to make a case to some person who looks 
like a judge in each individual case—not just come in and have a blanket 
closure policy for hundreds of different proceedings. 
Symposium, MLRC Roundtable—Defending Access Post 9/11: Responding to the 
National Security Challenge, MEDIA L. RES. CENT. BULL., Jan. 2003, at 1 [hereinafter 
MLRC Roundtable]. 
270 See id. at 25 (quoting Lee Gelernt, Esq., of the ACLU). 
271 MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 26 (stating that “this is an important public 
event that ought to be visible to people”).  Attorney Floyd Abrams of Cahill Gordon and 
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in protecting the nation from security threats.  The special interest 
measures skewed this relationship impermissibly in favor of the 
government by creating a categorical policy that intentionally 
excludes the press from courtrooms handling special interest 
respondents.272  The case-by-case approach clearly finds 
constitutional support273 by meeting the demands of the Richmond 
Newspapers test.274  When the test applies to a given proceeding, it 
affords the press with qualified courtroom access that cannot be 
undermined unless the government exhibits a compelling objective 
that it can fulfill through a narrowly tailored policy.275 
B. The Media Enjoys a Constitutionally Supported Qualified 
Access Right to Removal Proceedings 
Crucially, each of the courts that considered press access to 
removal proceedings supported employment of the Richmond 
Newspapers test to evaluate the press plaintiffs’ contentions.276  
The courts disagreed only in their analysis of the experience and 
logic prongs, with three of the four siding in favor of the 
plaintiffs.277  There is little doubt, however, that the Third Circuit 
 
Reindel added that, “one needs to press this theme of the press as a sort of lonely check 
on governmental abuse.” Id. 
272 See Creppy Directive, supra note 2, with its specific bar on press attendance in 
courtrooms employing special interest procedures. 
273 See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 692–93 (6th Cir. 2002); N. Jersey 
Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301–02 (D.N.J.) (finding constitutional 
support for an outcome that preserves the right of immigration judges to make case-by-
case determinations), rev’d, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002). 
274 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 692–93; N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 
301–02. 
275 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1986) (formalizing the parameters of the 
Richmond Newspapers experience and logic test and the accompanying presumption of 
access if a proceeding satisfies each of the prongs). 
276 See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 942 (E.D. Mich.), aff’d, 303 
F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002); Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 696; N. Jersey Media Group, 
205 F. Supp. 2d at 300; N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198, 208–09 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(confirming that press access to courtrooms is a First Amendment question decided under 
the Richmond Newspapers standard). 
277 See Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 947; Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 710; 
N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 305 (siding with press plaintiffs). But see N. 
Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 220–21 (siding in favor of the government’s special 
interest policy). 
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misapplied the Richmond Newspapers standard to the facts before 
it.278  As Judge Scirica articulated in his opinion dissenting from 
the Third Circuit majority,279 the majority unevenly applied both 
the experience and logic prongs.  Judge Scirica noted that the 
majority undersold an established history of openness that satisfied 
the experience prong,280 and mistreated perceived risks to national 
security, when it evaluated the logic and barred qualified access to 
a removal proceeding.281 
To support his contention that removal proceedings satisfied 
the Richmond Newspapers experience prong, Judge Scirica 
questioned whether the majority had inappropriately distinguished 
between judicial branch criminal proceedings and matters such as 
social security hearings.  The latter, he stated, had a long-standing 
tradition of closure.282  Judge Scirica asserted that removal 
proceedings possess great similarity to judicial branch proceedings 
because they are adjudicatory; social security hearings, on the 
other hand, adopt an inquisitorial model.283 
 
278 As ACLU attorney Lee Gelernt stated: 
I agree that the Third Circuit’s approach on the logic prong was wrong because 
the logic prong looks at whether openness would be beneficial to the general 
process at issue, here the deportation proceeding, and not at whether there may 
be reasons to close portions of hearings in particular cases or subsets of cases, 
such as national security cases, to protect against the disclosure of substantive 
information. 
Id. at 25. 
279 N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 221. 
280 Id. at 222–24 (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
281 See id. at 219 (“To the extent that the Attorney General’s national security concerns 
seem credible, we [the majority] will not lightly second-guess them.”). 
282 Id. at 223–34 (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
283 Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting).  According to Judge Scirica: 
Social Security benefits claim proceedings are distinguishable.  They “are 
inquisitorial rather than adversarial,” in that the Administrative Law Judge 
undertakes multiple roles as the investigator, counselor, and adjudicator.  Sims 
v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110–11 (2000).  The Supreme Court has identified the 
differences between Social Security claims and other administrative 
proceedings: 
 The differences between courts and agencies are nowhere more pronounced 
than in Social Security proceedings.  Although many agency systems of 
adjudication are based to a significant extent on the judicial model of 
decisionmaking, the SSA is perhaps the best example of an agency that is not.  
Id. at 110 (internal quotations omitted). 
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Judge Scirica emphasized that the majority’s logic calculus 
should not have been limited to an examination of special interest 
removal proceedings, but instead should have evaluated removal 
proceedings generally.284  Once Judge Scirica made this 
distinction, he found logic in maintaining a qualified openness for 
removal proceedings.  He said that if removal proceedings 
pertained only to potential national security concerns, he would 
close them as well.285  Yet, because they typically do not implicate 
security concerns, and instead address issues such as a 
respondent’s alleged “marriage fraud, moral turpitude convictions, 
and aggravated felonies,” Judge Scirica thought logic compelled 
qualified openness.286  Thus, Judge Scirica implicitly 
acknowledged the liberty interests at stake in removal proceedings, 
and the consequent importance of the press’s observational role. 
C. A Case-by-Case Approach to Courtroom Access, Rather Than 
the Special Interest Policy, Satisfies Strict Scrutiny 
1. No Compelling Governmental Objective 
Because little doubt exists that removal proceedings meet the 
experience and logic prongs, the government can overcome the 
press’s presumed access right only if it satisfies strict scrutiny by 
presenting a compelling objective and a matching narrowly 
tailored provision.287  Blanket closure of removal proceedings fails 
both portions of this test. 
 
Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
284 Id. at 225 (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
285 Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
286 Id. (Scirica, J., dissenting).  Mr. Gelernt echoed, “What the Third Circuit did, I think, 
was impermissibly side-step strict scrutiny.  It may be that there are reasons to close 
particular cases but that should not negate a general right of access to a particular type of 
proceeding.” MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 25. 
287 According to Mr. Gelernt, “once there is a general right of access to a type of 
proceeding, the government should have to meet strict scrutiny to overcome the qualified 
First Amendment right.”  Professor Cole added, “strict scrutiny almost implies it’s got to 
be done in an individual case by case basis, rather than the categorical cases.” MLRC 
Roundtable, supra note 269, at 25. 
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If the government’s interest is framed as an effort to prevent 
acts of terror within its borders—the generalized approach adopted 
by the Sixth Circuit288—it seems unreasonable to question whether 
the government’s interests rises to a compelling level.289  If one 
follows the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey’s 
approach, however, and divides the compelling interest into more 
specific components, the government’s interest lacks the same 
forcefulness.  In the New Jersey case, the court separated the 
government’s compelling interest in two subcategories: “(1) 
avoidance of setbacks to its terrorism investigation caused by open 
hearings; and (2) prevention of stigma or harm to detainees that 
might result if hearings were open.”290  Although the New Jersey 
district court did not state definitively whether either prong should 
be categorized as compelling,291 its commentary implied distrust of 
both of them.292  Moreover, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan293 and various scholars have explicitly echoed 
such sentiment. 
Those who question that open hearings alone constitute a 
reason for closure often point to the purely speculative nature of 
the mosaic theory.294  Numerous measures to prevent disclosure of 
information have, over time, proven misguided, including 
America’s now-derided decision295 to control Japanese Americans 
 
288 See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 706 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that 
“the Government certainly has a compelling interest in preventing terrorism”). 
289 See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 946–47 (E.D. Mich.), aff’d, 
303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (questioning whether the government’s interest was 
compelling). 
290 N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301 (D.N.J.), rev’d, 308 
F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).  The first prong the court highlighted pertains to the mosaic 
theory, and the government’s fear that information publicized from the hearings could 
unwittingly aid terrorists.  The second prong refers to the government’s argument that 
open hearings would harm respondents by stigmatizing them unnecessarily. 
291 Id. at 301–02. 
292 Id. 
293 Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 946–47. 
294 MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 39 (“While yes, we definitely have to protect 
national security,” said Attorney Laura Handman of Davis Wright Tremaine, “we need to 
have some evidence that disclosure will harm national security.”). 
295 See id. (quoting Professor Cole). 
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during World War II by placing them in internment camps.296  The 
Palmer Raids of 1920 serve as another cautionary tale.297  There, 
the government arrested nearly 4,000 individuals with alleged anti-
American affiliations,298 relying on tactics considered 
constitutionally inappropriate in retrospect.299  Similarly, despite 
the glowing praise that most historians bestow on President 
Abraham Lincoln, there exists widespread disapproval of Lincoln’s 
decision to suspend habeas corpus during the Civil War in order to 
silence critics of the tottering Union.300 
Others have stressed that efforts to prevent disclosure by 
closing hearings undermine the press freedoms that America’s 
Founding Fathers codified in the Bill of Rights.301  They argue that 
as a direct consequence of the limitations on press access, detained 
aliens have lacked their constitutionally-protected vehicle to share 
stories about the special interest process.302  As such, these critics 
have questioned whether other detainees have been treated like 
Hady Hassan Omar, without public knowledge.303 
 
296 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (confirming the 
constitutionality of this policy). 
297 MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 51. 
298 According to historian Allan Levine: 
[O]n the evening of Jan. 2, 1920, hundreds of agents from the U.S. Bureau of 
Investigation (it became the FBI in 1935), assisted by local police and 
volunteers from the American Legion, swarmed across much of the United 
States to arrest nearly 4,000 suspected radicals, Communists, Bolsheviks, 
anarchists and “aliens.”  Without proper arrest or search warrants in their 
possession, the agents invaded political party headquarters, private homes, even 
bowling alleys.  Many of those arrested were beaten, herded into crowded, 
unsanitary detention centres, and not allowed to communicate with their 
families or lawyers for weeks. 
Allan Levine, Return of the Red Scare, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 2, 2003, at A15. 
299 Id. 
300 MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 22.  Intriguingly, Handman indicates that 
Congress compelled President Lincoln to publicize the names of those individuals being 
detained during the suspension of habeas corpus. Id. at 22.  The special interest policy, on 
the other hand, makes no such concession. See Creppy Directive, supra note 2. 
301 Id. at 22. 
302 See id. (referring to Hady Hassan Omar’s plight, as chronicled in Brzezinski, supra 
note 91, at 50). 
303 MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 38.  According to Handman, “[w]hen they are 
detaining people and depriving them of their liberty, the public needs to know, has a right 
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As for the second governmental interest identified by the U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Jersey—the protection of 
respondents’ identities304—the government’s mandate “does not 
permit the individual to elect such protective treatment.”305  The 
district court added that, “this interest is coextensive with the 
individual’s preference to see it invoked, given that closure may be 
seen by some detainees as having a negative impact upon them and 
their interests.”306  In other words, the court argued that if a 
respondent prefers to have press observing a proceeding, she 
should have the personal liberty to make that choice. 
2. No Narrow Tailoring 
Even if one construes the government’s objectives as 
compelling, the measures employed to fulfill them fail the narrow 
tailoring requirement.307  Most of the arguments questioning the 
tailoring—both from courts and from commentators—have cited 
the Creppy Directive’s inability to prevent information with 
mosaic theory implications from leaving the courtroom.  As the 
Sixth Circuit noted, even the Attorney General’s order cannot 
constitutionally remedy this flaw.308  The order improperly limits 
participants in special interest cases from speaking about matters 
 
to know something about these important investigations done in their name. . . .  Are 
these detentions worth the price—the price in liberty?” Id. 
 Professor Cole believes the government had an interest other than the spread of 
information in mind.  “[I] think they wanted to use immigration authority to detain 
people. . . .  The fact that someone has overstayed his visa generally doesn’t authorize 
detaining the person.  It authorizes deporting them if [they are] not eligible for some sort 
of benefit.” Id. at 40. 
304 N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301 (D.N.J.), rev’d, 308 
F.3d 198 (3d. Cir 2002). 
305 Id. at 301–02. The court addressed this second prong as part of its tailoring analysis, 
but the question should have been assessed independently within an analysis of the 
government’s interests. Id.  The court, however, undertook no such effort. Id. 
306 Id. at 302. 
307 See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 709–10 (6th Cir. 2002) 
(agreeing that the government’s efforts failed to meet the narrow tailoring requirement); 
Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 947 (E.D. Mich.) (agreeing that the 
government’s efforts failed to meet the narrow tailoring requirement), aff’d, 303 F.3d 681 
(6th Cir. 2002); N. Jersey Media Group, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 301 (agreeing that the 
government’s efforts failed to meet the narrow tailoring requirement). 
308 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 708. 
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that are external to the proceedings, such as a respondent’s date 
and place of arrest, as well as his name.309 
The government’s efforts also lack narrow tailoring because 
they would impact upon press rights at criminal proceedings, even 
though Richmond Newspapers granted the press a qualified right of 
access to such courtrooms.310  Specifically, if the government fully 
applied the measures in the Creppy Directive intended to prevent 
the spread of an information mosaic, the government would have 
to utilize them in the cases of those held on purely criminal charges 
after September 11.311  Because Richmond Newspapers protected a 
qualified access right to criminal proceedings, however, 
employment of the blanket policy to this extent would directly 
contradict Supreme Court precedent.312  As a result, the Creppy 
Directive exhibits constitutionally impermissible over-breadth.313  
Others have critiqued the policy as overbroad because it may lead 
to more questionable detentions like that of Hady Hassan 
Omar’s—where the government eventually decided that it lacked 
sufficient grounds to employ special interest tactics.314 
D. Press as the Public’s Seeker of Truth 
Because the government failed to define compelling interests 
or a policy that exhibits suitably narrow tailoring, the special 
interest process clearly fails the strict scrutiny test and lacks 
constitutionality.  As such, there was no reason to deviate from the 
previously employed system of case-by-case closure, as compelled 
by the Richmond Newspapers test.  The case-by-case method more 
evenly balances the concerns of the government and the press than 
the special interest policy ever could.  America differentiates itself 
from more oppressive regimes by constitutionalizing the press’s 
duty to observe matters of all sorts on the public’s behalf.  Of 
 
309 Id. 
310 See MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 23 (drawing from Professor Cole’s 
commentary). 
311 Id. 
312 See id. 
313 Cole noted that “[t]heir arguments prove too much.” Id. at 23. 
314 See MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 36; Brzezinski, supra note 91, at 50. 
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course, certain instances may exist when the government has 
concretized reasons to fear that disclosure of information will 
directly compromise the nation’s safety.  Rather than deciding 
arbitrarily that the government interests trump those equally 
weighty concerns of the press, it is more appropriate for a judge to 
balance the competing interests in each case and to make specific 
determinations on closure as she sees fit. 
It is possible, however, that an EOIR judge without a clear 
understanding of the government’s national security scheme could 
make an uninformed decision on closure.  That is precisely why, in 
each case, the government must present facts to such a judge in 
order to make such a judge aware of special circumstances.  At the 
same time, the judge should have the opportunity to hear from 
press representatives who can make First Amendment arguments 
of their own.  This system may lead to perceived inconsistency, of 
course, as one case might remain open while another with 
superficially similar facts would close.  But that inconsistency is 
only an illusion because each case presents unique circumstances.  
A judge should rely on the discretion entrusted to her to make fair 
and just decisions. 
CONCLUSION: THE COURSE TO THE SUPREME COURT HAS BEEN SET 
“The last chapter of this issue and these cases has yet to be 
written.”315  Media interests have opted to challenge the Third 
Circuit’s decision,316 and in May 2003, Supreme Court began to 
consider whether to grant a writ of certiorari in order to determine 
the constitutionality of the special interest policy.317  Although it 
seems likely that the Supreme Court will grant a writ of certiorari 
to resolve the split between the Third and Sixth Circuits, there 
remains an “aura of unpredictability”318 regarding the case’s 
 
315 Eve Burton, supra note 246, at 65. 
316 Tony Mauro, Weighing Security Against Public Access: Justices to Consider 
Newspapers’ Petition Challenging Closed Deportation Proceedings for ‘Special Interest’ 
Aliens, LEGAL TIMES, May 19, 2003, at 11. 
317 Id. 
318 Marcia Coyle, Immigration Issue Splits U.S. Courts: It’s Media v. U.S. on Closed 
Hearings, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 14, 2002, at A1.  Ms. Burton cautions both the government 
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outcome.  Therefore, “It’s going to take some very serious thinking 
about how to count to five on this case in this court,”319 and 
observers remain uncertain whether the special interest policy will 
survive the Court’s scrutiny.320 
The Court last evaluated a press access matter when it 
sharpened the experience and logic test in its June 1986 Press-
Enterprise II decision.321  In that case, the Court held in favor of 
press interests that had sought access to preliminary trial 
proceedings.322  Since then, the Court’s membership has changed 
dramatically: only Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice John 
Paul Stevens and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor remain.323 
Unfortunately, examination of the justices’ decisions in these 
cases fails to make clear how these justices will respond to the 
current press issue.  Justice Stevens wrote in Richmond 
Newspapers that, “the First Amendment protects the public and 
press from abridgement of their rights of access to information 
about the operation of their government, including the judicial 
branch.”324  This indicates that Justice Stevens might support the 
application of First Amendment rights to the administrative 
proceedings that have been closed by the special interest policy.  
Nevertheless, Justice Stevens dissented in both Globe Newspaper 
v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk325 and Press-
Enterprise II,326 even though he concurred with the majority in 
Press-Enterprise I.327  Chief Justice Rehnquist exhibited 
inconsistency because he dissented in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. 
 
and press interests to “proceed carefully” because “both sides face uncertainties.”  Eve 
Burton, supra note 246, at 65. 
319 MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 32 (quoting Lee Levine, Esq., of Levine, 
Sullivan, and Koch). 
320 See Coyle, supra note 318, at A1. 
321 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986). 
322 Id. at 2. 
323 See Supreme Court of the United States, Biographies of Current Members of the 
Supreme Court, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/about.html (last 
visited May 13, 2003). 
324 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 584 (1980) (emphasis added). 
325 457 U.S. 596, 620 (1982). 
326 478 U.S. at 15. 
327 464 U.S. at 516 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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v. Virginia,328 Globe Newspaper329 and Press-Enterprise II,330 but 
he sided with the Press-Enterprise I majority.331  It seems possible 
that Justice O’Connor would side with the current media plaintiffs 
because she supported the media in Globe Newspaper,332 Press-
Enterprise I,333 and Press-Enterprise II.334  Still, Justice O’Connor 
had not yet assumed her seat on the Court when it decided 
Richmond Newspapers,335 so her record may not clearly indicate 
how she will evaluate the current circuit split. 
Some of the Court’s justices also might be swayed to alter the 
Richmond Newspapers test because nearly twenty years have 
elapsed since the last holding in the Richmond Newspapers line.  
Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice O’Connor tend to avoid bright-
line tests like the Richmond Newspapers standard so they may opt 
for a standard that reflects their preferred principles.336  Justice 
Breyer, for one,337 might be more inclined to adopt a flexible 
measure similar to the one he employed in his Bartnicki v. 
Vopper338 concurring opinion.339 
If the Court maintains the Richmond Newspapers standard in 
its current form, however, the experience prong may be important 
to Justice Clarence Thomas,340 who emphasized the importance of 
 
328 448 U.S. at 604. 
329 457 U.S. at 612. 
330 478 U.S. at 15. 
331 464 U.S. at 503. 
332 457 U.S. at 611 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
333 464 U.S. at 503. 
334 478 U.S. at 3. 
335 448 U.S. 555, 584 (1980); see also  supra note 323. 
336 MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 18 (“You have a number of justices on this 
Court, Justice Breyer and Justice O’Connor foremost among them, who don’t like bright-
line tests.”). 
337 See id. (highlighting Mr. Levine’s thoughts on Justice Breyer). 
338 532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
339 See id. at 535 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Bartnicki pertained to statutory language that 
affected the public broadcast of intercepted cellular telephone communication.  In his 
concurrence, Justice Breyer said that he “would ask whether the statutes strike a 
reasonable balance between their speech-restricting and speech-enhancing 
consequences.” Id. at 536 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
340 See MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 32 (quoting Mr. Levine’s statement that 
Justice Thomas has a preference for history). 
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historical context in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission.341  
Justice Breyer might treat the experience prong less rigidly.342  
When Justice Breyer sat on the First Circuit, he signed onto a 
majority decision343 that involved the Richmond Newspapers test 
involving access to a bail hearing.344  “Essentially, the opinion 
said, even though there is no history of access to bail proceedings, 
that’s no problem.”345  Another case from his tenure on the First 
Circuit, however, exposes an inconsistency in Breyer’s stance 
toward the Richmond Newspapers test.  Justice Breyer signed onto 
a majority decision346 that questioned whether Richmond 
Newspapers and its progeny extend beyond the criminal court 
context.347 
An argument that emphasizes the plenary power of Congress 
over the executive branch also might play well before Justice 
O’Connor, as well as Justice Anthony Kennedy.  Because the court 
cannot easily conduct substantive review of executive branch 
activities in immigration and national security, it becomes “all the 
more important” to allow journalists to observe removal 
proceedings so that they can detail the procedures for the public’s 
benefit.348  Otherwise, the executive branch would operate without 
checks on its conduct.349  Nevertheless, the Court may refrain from 
this approach for fear of interfering at all with Congress’s plenary 
authority.350 
 
341 514 U.S. 334, 358 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).  The Court allowed a petitioner 
to distribute anonymous leaflets regarding a proposed school tax, even though the action 
violated Ohio state law.  Justice Thomas asserted that the chief question in the case was 
“whether the phrase ‘freedom of speech, or of the press,’ as originally understood, 
protected anonymous political leafletting.” Id. at 359. 
342 See MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 19 (noting comments of David Schulz, 
Esq., of Clifford Chance). 
343 In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1984). 
344 MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 19. 
345 Id. (quoting David Schulz). 
346 El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez-Colon, 963 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1992). 
347 MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 19. 
348 See generally id. (referring to the comments of Professor Cole and Floyd Abrams, 
Esq.). 
349 Id. 
350 See Coyle, supra note 318, at A1 (quoting Peter Shane, a legal scholar at Carnegie-
Mellon University). 
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Access to removal proceedings also may raise questions of law 
that might not fit neatly into the Richmond Newspapers line 
because the issue presents a rare juxtaposition of administrative 
and First Amendment law.351  Because the Court has dealt only 
with judicial branch proceedings in its previous holdings in the 
Richmond Newspapers line352 rather than administrative 
proceedings or other functions of the executive branch, the Court 
might permit the special interest policy to continue.353  “If the 
[C]ourt should be persuaded that there is a pervasive national 
security problem with every single immigration case in this area, 
we are going to lose the case and they will find the words for us to 
lose it.”354 
In the end, the Court may consider the security risks too great 
to permit qualified public access.355  Such arguments convinced the 
Third Circuit’s majority, and may continue to hold sway.356  
History does not offer further guidance because the Court has 
inconsistently treated challenges to executive branch tactics during 
times of war.  Will the Court follow the logic of Korematsu357 and 
support the government’s contention that times of war require 
limitations on liberty?358  Or will the Court follow the media-
 
351 According to Jan Ting, a professor of immigration and tax law at the Temple 
University School of Law, “[m]y own feeling is this is almost unprecedented. . . . I’m just 
unaware of a prior First Amendment access claim being made successfully in an 
immigration case.  I was very surprised by the 6th Circuit decision.” Id. 
352 Expansion of the Richmond Newspapers test to contexts outside of judicial branch 
proceedings has occurred only in Circuit and District Court decisions. 
353 Professor Ting asked, “[i]f you’re going to allow a First Amendment right, where do 
you draw a line? Why shouldn’t the New York Times be able to send a reporter into 
cabinet meetings?” Coyle, supra note 318, at A1. 
354 See MLRC Roundtable, supra note 269, at 26 (quoting Abrams). 
355 Author Roger Parloff wrote, “[f]rom a judge’s perspective, the argument is 
horrifyingly difficult to reject.  The executive branch is saying to the judiciary: We can’t 
be specific, and we know you may not understand, but you must trust us—otherwise, the 
blood will be on your hands.” Roger Parloff, Dicta: Closed Doors, AM. LAW. 130 (2002). 
356 Parloff then noted the effect of the government’s argument on Judge Morton 
Greenberg, one of the two judges on the Third Circuit who comprised the majority in N. 
Jersey Media Group.  In oral arguments on Sept. 17, 2002, Judge Greenberg stated that, 
“[w]e could make a decision here and people could die.  Lots of people.”  Id. 
357 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
358 Id. at 219–220.  In the case that confirmed the constitutionality of Japanese 
American internment during World War II, the Court opined: 
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supportive approach of New York Times v. United States,359 which 
asserted the rights of the press to serve as the public’s sentry?  In 
due time, the Justices will let us know. 
 
 
[H]ardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships.  All 
citizens alike, both in and out of uniform, feel the impact of war in greater or 
lesser measure.  Citizenship has its responsibilities as well as its privileges, and 
in time of war the burden is always heavier.  Compulsory exclusion of large 
groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direst 
emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions.  
But when under conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by 
hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened 
danger. 
Id.  Although never overturned, Korematsu was denounced as an ill-advised venture “into 
the ugly abyss of racism.” Id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
359 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (preventing the government from imposing a prior restraint on 
the press’s publication of confidential government documents it had secured from a third 
party). 
